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I. INTRODUCTION
Regulatory regimes that require vertically integrated firms to share
hard-to-replicate infrastructures-such as electricity transmission lines,
railroad tracks, or the last-mile connections in telecommunications
networks-create potential incentive problems, as vertically integrated
firms may be induced to discriminate against upstream or downstream
competitors. For example, electricity firms might discriminate in favor of
their own generation plants against independent generators; railroad track
owners might discriminate against competing owners of rolling stock; or
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telecommunications network operators might discriminate against
competing service providers.
To prevent such discrimination, regulators sometimes adopt rules
requiring equal treatment or "nondiscriminatory access" to bottleneck
facilities-for example, requiring telephone companies to provision lines
for competitors' retail customers as quickly and reliably as for their own.'
Such regulations are subject to the limitations inherent in all such principal-
agent relationships: regulators typically have incomplete information,
monitoring and policing compliance is costly, and the results are likely to
be imperfect.
One approach to preventing discrimination is to require some form of
vertical disintegration, or "separation," by the regulated firm. In their
mildest forms, mandates for "accounting separation" may simply require
the firm to maintain separate records for its upstream and downstream
divisions, thus facilitating regulators' efforts to monitor compliance.2 At
the opposite end of the spectrum, regulators may force full structural
separation, or complete divestiture, of the bottleneck facilities into a
separate firm. In between, there is a potentially infinite range of
"operational" or "functional" separation alternatives which impose various
requirements for "arms-length" dealing, while stopping short of complete
divestiture.3
Current proposals for vertical separation are motivated primarily by
perceived problems in implementing mandatory access (or unbundling)
regimes, which force incumbents to lease portions of their last-mile
networks to competitors at regulated prices.4 While mandatory unbundling
1. For example, in the United States, the FCC is required by Section 251 (c)(3) of the
1996 Telecommunications Act to mandate that local exchange carriers provide
"nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis" to any requesting
telecommunications carrier. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. For instance, the European Regulatory Group (ERG) describes the components of
functional separation as follows: (1) separation of functions, (2) separation of employees,
and (3) separation of information. Presumably, (3) is the mildest form of separation. See
ERG, ERG Opinion on Functional Separation, (07) 44, 2007, available at http://www.erg.
eu.int/doc/publications/erg07_44_cpon functional separation.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Perhaps the strongest advocate of structural separation in recent years has been
Viviane Reding, the former European commissioner for information, who opined in a 2006
speech, "I believe that the policy option of structural separation could answer many
competition problems that Europe's telecom markets are still facing today." Press Release,
Member of the European Commission Responsible for Information Society and Media, The
Review 2006 of EU Telecom rules: Strengthening Competition and Completing the Internal
Market Annual Meeting of BITKOM, (June 27, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/422&format=HTML&aged=l &langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en. See also Martin Ammori, Competition and Investment in
Wireline Broadband, in AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR ALL: A POLICY AGENDA FOR A NEW
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has been substantially scaled back in the United States (and was only
briefly applied to broadband services in the form of line sharing), it remains
a regulatory staple in much of the rest of the world, including the European
Union and several Pacific Basin nations.5
By its very nature, mandated vertical separation involves a regulatory
decision to alter the degree of vertical integration that market forces have
otherwise developed. In telecommunications markets, it is commonplace
for network infrastructures to be owned and operated by the same firms
that provide retail services directly to subscribers.6 Economic theory posits
that vertical integration is most likely to be economically efficient in
industries where there are significant sunk costs (i.e., "asset specificity")
and where there are high levels of complexity or uncertainty-all
characteristics associated with the modem telecommunications industry. To
the extent mandated vertical separation disrupts or reduces these
efficiencies, it may discourage the introduction of new networks, thereby
reducing economic welfare and harming consumers. Concerns about the
potential for such disruptions--combined with recognition that the more
extreme forms of separation potentially are irreversible-have led most
regulators to back away from mandatory separation, or to view it as a "last
resort," to be used only in cases of extreme and otherwise irremediable
discrimination.7
Nevertheless, since 2002, five nations-Australia (2005), Italy (2002,
2008), New Zealand (2007), Sweden (2008), and the United Kingdom
(2005)-have adopted some form of mandatory vertical separation,8 and
the European Parliament is on the verge of embracing functional separation
as a potential remedy for use by European Union (EU) national regulators
ADMINISTRATION 81, 95-97 (Amit M. Schejter, ed., 2009).
5. For the EU, the relevant regulation is Reg. (EC) No. 2887/2000 of 18 Dec. 2000,
available at http://europa.eulegislation-summaries/information-society/124108jen.htm on
unbundled access to the local loop.
6. In virtually every OECD country, the primary incumbent telephone companies own
a large national network and provide retail voice, Internet, and even video services directly
to final consumers. Examples include AT&T, British Telecom, France Telecom, Deutsche
Telekom, NTT (Japan), and Verizon. OECD, COMMUNICATIONS OUTLOOK 2009:
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (2009) [hereinafter OECD
COMMUNICATIONS OUTLOOK].
7. See, e.g., Malcolm Webb, The Emergence of Functional Separation, in
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, TRENDS IN TELECOMMUNICATION REFORM
2008: Six DEGREES OF SHARING 139, 144-46 (2008).
8. See infra Section IV. In addition, in 2007, Mongolia nationalized the infrastructure
assets of its incumbent telecommunications company, thus effectively separating them from
the retail operations, which continue to be private. Certain other countries, including France,
have implemented less-stringent separation requirements (e.g., accounting separation). See
Webb, supra note 7, at 146. See infra Sec. IV.
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(albeit only as an "exceptional measure"). 9 As the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) noted in 2008, "[t]here has been a
tremendous amount of interest around the world recently in functional
separation as a regulatory remedy in the telecommunication sector."10
In this Article, we examine the arguments for and against mandated
vertical separation in telecommunications. Section II discusses the
regulatory case for mandatory separation in telecommunications markets
and describes the types of separation regimes typically advanced. Section
III explains relevant economic theories of vertical integration and their
application to telecommunications markets, concluding that
telecommunications possesses many of the characteristics economists
associate with the presence of strong efficiency effects of vertical
integration. Section IV describes the separation regimes that have been
adopted to date-in Australia, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom-and briefly summarizes the market circumstances in each
country at the time separation was implemented. Section V presents the
available empirical evidence on the impact of mandatory separation in each
of these countries, focusing specifically on broadband adoption and
infrastructure investment. Section VI briefly examines the appropriateness
of mandatory separation for the United States. In Section VII we
summarize our central conclusion, which is that the available evidence fails
to support the proposition that mandatory separation improves market
performance, but this evidence does suggest that such a policy leads to
reduced levels of innovation and investment. Adoption of mandatory
separation in the United States would represent a radical departure from
current policies, which would be extremely disruptive and likely to produce
9. See Council of the Eur. Union, No. 15695/08 of 20 Nov. 2008, 2007 COD (0247)
21, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/stl 5/st 15695.enO8.pdf.
Where the national regulatory authority concludes that the appropriate obligations
imposed under Articles 9 to 13 have failed to achieve effective competition and
that there are important and persisting competition problems/market failures
identified in relation to the wholesale provision of certain access products, it may,
as an exceptional measure, in accordance with the provisions of the second
subparagraph of Article 8(3), impose an obligation on vertically integrated
undertakings to place activities related to the wholesale provision of these access
products in an independently operating business entity.
See also Press Release, European Parliament, Telecom Markets: Still No Overall Agreement
with Council Presidency (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
news/expert/infopress_page/058-54125-111-04-17-909-200904211PR54124-21-04-2009-
2009-false/default en.htm.
10. Webb, supra note 7 at 139. Australia is actively considering a more stringent
"functional" separation proposal. See Australian Government, National Broadband
Network: Regulatory Reform for 21st Century Broadband 20-23 (Apr. 2009) (discussion
paper, available at http://www.dbcde.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf file/0006/l10013/NBN_
RegulatoryReform-for the_21 st CenturyBroadband low resweb.pdf [hereinafter
National Broadband Network Discussion Paper].
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few, if any, benefits while imposing extremely large costs.
II. UNBUNDLING AND DISCRIMINATION IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS: THE REGULATORY CASE
FOR SEPARATION
Mandatory unbundling policies for telecommunications networks
were first adopted in Hong Kong in 1995, rolled out aggressively in the
United States after passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and
adopted in most other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries between 1999 and 2001."1 Beginning in
2003, the FCC-prompted by the courts-began reversing course, initially
by forbearing from imposing unbundling for broadband services delivered
over optical fiber, hybrid-fiber-coax (HFC) and through line sharing over
traditional copper networks. 2 In 2004, it eliminated the so-called "UNE-
Platform" (UNE-P), a requirement that incumbents offer the entire local
telecommunications platform at low, wholesale rates.' 3 In 2005, the FCC
essentially deregulated telephone companies' DSL services by declaring
them to be "information services. 14
In contrast to the United States, most OECD nations have continued
to pursue mandatory unbundling of local loops for both voice and
11. See Yoshikazu Okamoto, The Influence of Market Developments and Policies on
Telecommunication Investment 14 (OECD Digital Economy Papers, Paper No. 151, 2009),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/222517643310. For a more complete history of
unbundling in the European Union, see also Paul W.J. de Biji & Martin Peitz, Local Loop
Unbundling in Europe: Experience, Prospects and Policy Challenges, CoMMS. &
STRATEGIES, 2005, at 33, 35-40, available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2441/. See
also Statement by the Telecommunications Authority of Hong Kong, Interconnection and
Related Competition Issues, Interconnection Configurations and Basic Underlying
Principles Statement No. 6 on 3 June 1995, available at http://www.ofta.gov.hk/
en/tas/interconnect/ta950603.html.
12. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, paras. 3,4 (2003).
13. Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Review of the Section 251 Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Order on Remand, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533
(2005). UNE-P was the most aggressive form of network unbundling for traditional voice
services, as it allowed entrants to offer local services without investing in any of their own
facilities. Despite the repeal of the UNE-P requirement, however, the entrants continue to
have access to the incumbents' unbundled loops, using them for more than thirty-six percent
of their local connections as of the end of 2007, according to the FCC's latest report. See
INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FCC, LOCAL TELEPHONE
COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2007 tbl.3 (2008), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-285509A1 .pdf.
14. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, para.
12 (2005).
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broadband services. 15 Hence, regulators in these countries continue to
grapple with the incentive problems created when mandatory unbundling
regimes are imposed on incumbent carriers, and to explore the role -of
vertical separation requirements in addressing those problems.
A. Mandatory Unbundling and the Incentive Problem
When regulators force vertically integrated incumbents to lease access
to their networks to competitors at binding maximum prices, incumbents
may have incentives to engage in non-price discrimination in favor of their
own retail services. 16 Such discrimination, in principle, could take any
number of forms, from providing competitors with slower installation times
to failing to provide adequate interfaces for operations support systems
(OSS) necessary to coordinate the ordering and billing of services. As the
FCC explained in its 1996 Order implementing the unbundling provisions
of the Telecommunications Act,
[w]e are also cognizant of the fact that incumbent LECs have the
incentive and the ability to engage in many kinds of discrimination.
For example, incumbent LECs could potentially delay providing
access to unbundled network elements, or they could provide them to
new entrants at a degraded level of quality.
17
In this context, the challenge for regulators is to devise mechanisms for
detecting and policing potential discrimination. In principle, regulators
have two choices: they can impose behavioral rules on incumbents,
requiring them to meet various regulatory metrics for providing service on
a nondiscriminatory basis, backed up by some form of case-by-case
enforcement mechanism and penalties; or, they can attempt to alter
incumbents' incentives by imposing some form of mandatory separation.
The primary argument for mandated separation is that it reduces or (in
the extreme) eliminates the incentive of the incumbent network operator to
engage in non-price discrimination in favor of its own retail operations.' 8
15. See OECD COMMUNICATIONS OUTLOOK, supra note 6, at 53-59, tbl.2.9.
16. Note that the dominant firm's incentive to discriminate is largely a function of
wholesale price controls. See, e.g., GEORGE YARROW AND CHRISTOPHER DECKER, REG.
POL'Y INST., REFLECTIONS ON POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY NEXT-GENERATION ACCESS
NETWORKS IN COMMUNICATIONS 3 (2008), available at http://www.rpieurope.org/
ResearchlYarrow/o20Decker%/2ONGAN%20Report.pdf ("Strong incentives to abuse
dominant positions characterised by vertical integration are caused chiefly by price
regulation, which heavily constrains profits at a particular point in the vertical chain.
Structural separation is, in effect, usually a remedy for incentive distortions that would not
exist but for tight price controls.").
17. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications.
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, para. 307 (1996) [hereinafter First
Report and Order]. See also Webb, supra note 7, at 141 (listing various forms of non-price
discrimination).
18. See, e.g., Paul W. J. de Bijl, Structural Separation and Access in
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Simply put, in the absence of mandatory separation, the incumbent has
incentives to maximize the joint profits of its upstream network operations
and its downstream retail affiliate. Further, to the extent the firm has, or
reasonably believes it can acquire, market power in the downstream
market, joint profit maximization may entail raising the costs of its
upstream facilities to its downstream rivals (and thus deterring or slowing
their entry). This strategy can be profitable to the integrated firm, even at
the cost of reduced sales, and thus reduced profits, in its upstream division.
If the upstream unit can be forced to maximize profits independent of the
interests of its retail affiliate, it will no longer have an incentive-in
theory-to discriminate.'
9
B. Forms of Separation
The terms "accounting," "operational," "functional," and "structural"
typically are used to describe different types of separation mandates. At the
extremes-accounting separation and structural separation-the terms are
relatively unambiguous. Under accounting separation, the vertically
integrated firm is required to follow specified accounting conventions for
allocating the costs and revenues of upstream and downstream services into
separate baskets, thus allowing regulators to set wholesale prices for the
upstream service; however, the firm continues to operate as a vertically
integrated whole, thereby preventing the loss of vertical efficiencies. 20
Under full structural separation, on the other hand, the upstream and
downstream portions of the firm are literally divided into separate
companies with different ownership, management, etc.2' Under structural
separation, all vertical efficiencies that depend upon joint ownership and
Telecommunications Markets 6 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1554, 2005), available at
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDLcesifolwpl554.pdf ("Separation eliminates the
incumbent's retail operation's ability and incentives to discriminate in the downstream
market. In particular, it eliminates the incumbent's incentives and possibilities, whether
legal, economic or technical, to raise the costs of its rival firms by reducing quality or
increasing the cost of access, which would lead to 'double marginalization' and hence an
inefficiency."). See also OECD, WORKING PARTY ON TELECOMMUNICATON AND
INFORMATION SERVICES POLICIES, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF STRUCTURAL SEPARATION OF
THE LOCAL LoOP 9 (2003); Webb, supra note 7, at 143.
19. Vertical separation may also facilitate the regulator's ability to impose an
equivalence of input (EOI) nondiscrimination standard. Under an EOI standard, the network
operator is required to provide its affiliated retailer with precisely the same services as its
competitors. Under an equivalence of outputs standard, on the other hand, the unaffiliated
retailers may be offered different but equivalent services. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 7, at
143. See also National Broadband Network Discussion Paper, supra note 10, at 19.
20. See e.g., Martin Cave, Six Degrees of Separation: Operational Separation as a
Remedy in European Telecommunications Regulation, CoMMs. & STRATEGIES, 2006.
21. See e.g.,id.
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control are eliminated.22
Between the two extremes, there is a wide variety of options, typically
categorized as "operational" or "functional" separation. In general,
operational separation refers to the creation of a separate division within
the firm whose mission is to service wholesale customers, while the firm's
retail operations are essentially unaffected-i.e., they continue to operate as
an integrated part of the firm.23 Under functional separation, on the other
hand, the firm's retail operations are to one degree or another set apart-
legally, organizationally, and/or physically-from its upstream network
24
operations. The greater the separation, the greater the independence
between the network and retail operations and, at least in theory, the less
incentive the network operator has to discriminate in favor of its affiliated
retail arm.25 By the same token, of course, increased separation reduces the
ability to capture vertical economies.
In practice, both operational and functional separation involve dozens
of granular decisions about precisely how the "separated" firm is to
operate. Who is to report to whom? Who is permitted to talk with whom,
and about what topics? What systems can be shared between the regulated
network operator and its retail affiliate, and which ones must be
duplicated? And, perhaps most important, who is compensated for what-
that is, to what extent are the operators of the upstream and downstream
divisions incentivized to maximize the performance of their own divisions
versus the performance of the firm as a whole?26 How these questions are
answered determines the extent to which mandated separation affects both
managers' incentives to discriminate in the provision of services to
competitors and their ability (and desire) to capture vertical economies.
Ill. MANDATORY SEPARATION AND THE ECONOMICS OF
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
While it is fairly commonplace for telecommunications providers to
offer services on both a wholesale and retail basis, we are aware of few
examples of market forces inducing incumbent carriers to forego the
provision of retail services altogether-i.e., to engage voluntarily in
structural separation.27 Nor do profit-maximizing firms, as a general matter,
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. For a useful discussion of the various forms of separation, see id. at 89.
27. In 2007, the Australian-based owners of Ireland's incumbent carrier, Eircom,
proposed voluntarily to structurally separate its retail from its wholesale operations but
pulled back in the face of financial difficulties. The firm has since been sold to new owners.
See Webb, supra note 7, at 145; see also Andris Brieze et al, Functional Separation in
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erect organizational or other barriers to internal coordination, as is the case
with functional separation.28
Economists have developed several theories which explain the
efficiency rationale for vertical integration, beginning with Ronald Coase's
classic formulation of The Nature of the Firm in 1937.29 These theories,
stressing the efficiency effects of combining vertically related activities
within a single firm, have received substantial empirical support,30 and they
can be utilized to explain why vertical integration of telecommunications
continues into the modem competitive era, and why any policy that alters
the degree of integration runs the risk of reducing efficiency and
investment in telecommunications.
A. The Economics of Vertical Integration
Economic theories of vertical integration focus on the relative merits
of firms (i.e., vertical integration) as compared with the market (i.e.,
contracts) as mechanisms for organizing economic endeavors in the
presence of risk, uncertainty, and transaction costs.
3
'
When multiple economic actors are required to make sunk-cost
investments in some joint activity, the returns to which are contingent on
unknown or unpredictable future events, it becomes costly (if not
impossible) to write contracts among them that completely capture all of
the possible future states of the world and allocate responsibilities and
payoffs (i.e., profits) appropriately.32 Furthermore, the presence of
Central and Eastern Europe, KPMG (Mar. 2009) at 19, available at
http://www.kpmg.com.co/publicaciones/Biblioteca-Virtual/archivos/ICE/2009/julio/Functio
nal%20Separation%20in%2OCentral%20&%2OEastem%20Europe.pdf; see also Ciara
O'Brien, Terms Agreed for Eircom Sale, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.irishtimescom/newspaper/breaking/2009/0914/breakingl4.html. As discussed
in Section IV, some carriers have engaged in separation while under pressure from
regulators to do so but prior to the issuance of formal regulatory commands. We do not
regard these cases as examples of "voluntary" separation in the sense used here.
28. See R. H. Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386 (1937).
29. See id.
30. See infra. notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost
Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1443 (1974).
[TJhe transaction cost approach attempts to identify a set of market or
transactional factors which together with a related set of human factors explain
the circumstances under which complex contracts involving contingent claims
will be costly to write, execute, and enforce. Faced with such difficulties, and
considering the risks that simple, and therefore incomplete, contingent claims
contracts pose, the firm may decide to bypass the market and resort to hierarchical
modes of organization. Transactions that might otherwise be handled in the
market would then be performed internally and governed by administrative
processes.
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incomplete contracts creates the potential for both moral hazard (i.e.,
underperformance or shirking of contractual obligations) as well as for
opportunistic ex post behavior, especially when the assets involved are
specific to the economic activity at hand and cannot easily be put to
alternative use.33 The results are to increase the costs and risks of
investment and to reduce the level of investment below the otherwise
optimal level.
Vertical integration addresses these problems by internalizing the
payouts among the (otherwise) contracting parties and by limiting the
potential for shirking. Rather than trying to write contingent contracts that
specify each and every possible future state of the world and allocate
responsibilities and consequences for each of the parties, the parties simply
agree ex ante to combine their efforts, to be directed within wide bounds by
a central authority, and to share according to some pre-agreed (and non-
negotiable) formula in the results-that is, they agree to create a firm.
In terms of testable propositions, these theories predict that the
economic efficiency gains from vertical integration will be greatest in the
presence of asset specificity (i.e., the need to invest in assets which cannot
easily be moved to an alternative use) and high levels of complexity or
uncertainty in production processes or market conditions. As a recent
survey of the economics literature on vertical integration by Francine
Lafontaine and Margaret Slade explains, "asset specificity generates a flow
of quasi rents that are associated with ex post haggling and opportunism,
whereas complexity and uncertainty lead to contractual incompleteness. 34
B. Empirical Evidence Relating to Vertical Integration
Lafontaine and Slade present an extensive review of the empirical
literature on the effects of vertical integration, summarizing the results of
economic studies that focus on both the motivations for vertical integration
Id.
33. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON.
297,298 (1978).
The crucial assumption underlying the analysis of this paper is that, as assets
become more specific and more appropriable quasi rents are created (and therefore
the possible gains from opportunistic behavior increases), the costs of contracting
will generally increase more than the costs of vertical integration. Hence, ceteris
paribus, we are more likely to observe vertical integration.
Id.
34. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries:
The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 629, 653 (2007). In addition to the "moral hazard" and
"transactions cost" theories of vertical integration discussed herein, Lafontaine and Slade
also discuss the "property rights" theory, but find little empirical support for it. Id. at 650-
53,658-60.
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and the results of such integration, and conclude that numerous empirical
studies support both the transactions cost and moral hazard models for
vertical integration.35 Specifically, they find that the empirical evidence
supports the theoretical predictions that vertical integration is more likely
in markets where various forms of asset specificity (e.g., physical capital
specificity) are present and where uncertainty (e.g., the inability accurately
to predict future sales) and complexity (e.g., complicated product design)
are present.36 Overall, they conclude, "[t]he weight of the evidence is
overwhelming. Indeed, virtually all predictions from transaction-cost
analysis appear to be borne out by the data.
' 37
Perhaps even more important, the empirical evidence also supports
the proposition that vertical integration is more likely to promote efficiency
and benefit consumers than to facilitate market foreclosure or other
anticompetitive outcomes, even in highly concentrated industries. Based on
a review of ten empirical studies that evaluate whether vertical integration
resulted in foreclosure or raising rivals' costs, Lafontaine and Slade
conclude that "[t]he evidence in favor of anticompetitive foreclosure is
therefore, at best weak, particularly when one considers that the industries
studied were chosen because their vertical practices have been the subject
of antitrust investigations. 38 On the other hand, LaFontaine and Slade's
review of sixteen studies that assess the ultimate effect of vertical
integration on consumer welfare, thirteen find consumer welfare is
increased, with the remaining three finding the effect to be ambiguous.
39
On the basis of their review, Lafontaine and Slade conclude that
under most circumstances, profit-maximizing vertical-integration
decisions are efficient, not just from the firms' but also from the
consumers' points of view. Although there are isolated studies that
contradict this claim, the vast majority support it. Moreover, even in
industries that are highly concentrated so that horizontal considerations
assume substantial importance, the net effect of vertical integration
appears to be positive in many instances .... Furthermore, we have
found clear evidence that restrictions on vertical integration that are
35. Id at 631-60.
36. Id. at 658-59.
37. Id. at 658. Lafontaine and Slade's findings are consistent with those of other
reviews. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in
Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 344
(1995) ("To sum up, the evidence on the transactional determinants of vertical integration
seems quite striking. Asset specificity and uncertainty appear to have significant effects on
the vertical structure of production. This is especially remarkable when compared with the
relative dearth of evidence on market-power explanations for integration."). See also Paul L.
Joskow, Vertical Integration, in ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW & POLICY 273 (Wayne Dale
Collins, et al. eds., 2008).
38. See Lafontaine & Slade, supra note 34, at 673.
39. Seeid. attbl. 16.
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imposed .. on owners of retail networks are usually detrimental to
consumers. 40
In short, the economics literature provides strong support, from both a
theoretical and an empirical perspective, for the proposition that-as a
general matter-mandatory vertical separation is likely to reduce efficiency
and, on net, harm consumer welfare.
C. Vertical Integration in Telecommunications Markets
Telecommunications networks display virtually all of the
characteristics economists associate with strong vertical efficiencies. First,
the construction and operation of telecommunications networks requires
the commitment of billions of dollars in assets that are highly specific to
the operations of the carrier.41 These assets are located and designed
specifically to serve that carrier's network needs in its service area: the
assets cannot be used for other purposes, and most of them cannot be
moved economically to other locations.42 Once deployed, they must be
used to deliver telecommunications services in that area.43 In short,
telecommunications networks display an extremely high level of asset
specificity.
Second, modem telecommunications networks also display high
levels of complexity and uncertainty. Broadband technologies have
changed dramatically 44 and are expected to continue to change. 45 Similarly,
market conditions are subject to high degrees of uncertainty, as market
demand for broadband and related services (voice, video) is constantly
shifting and evolving.
Under these circumstances, the costs of coordinating upstream and
downstream activities through contracts are likely to be high, and the case
for vertical integration especially strong.
46
40. See id. at 680.
41. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUEs LAFFONT AND JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2000); see also W. Kip VIsCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON JR. AND
JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 523-53 (4th ed. 2005).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. For an early discussion of the technology, see Matti Rantanen, FTTH -Fiber to the
Home (1998), available at http://users.tkk.fi/mjrantan/FTrH.html.
45. For example, Verizon recently announced an acceleration in its deployment of 4G.
See Press Release, Verizon Wireless, Verizon Wireless' 4G LTE Network Testing Promises
Significantly Faster Speeds Than Current 3G Networks, (Mar. 8, 2010), available at
http://news.vzw.com/news/2010/03/pr2OlO-03-02b.html. Sprint-Clearwire is the leader in
deploying WiMax. See Phil Goldstein, Sprint Drops the Price of Mobile WiMax by another
$10, WIRELESS NEWS, Jan. 15, 2010, available at http://conmunity.sprint.com/
baw/thread/26309.
46. The fact that vertical integration is generally preferred does not mean that
contracting out or reselling can never be efficient. For example, despite the repeal of the
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Consider why it would ever make sense for the ownership of the core
network assets to be separate from the delivery of downstream services
over that network. Specifically, envision a situation in which company N
owned the basic feeder and distribution network and another company, S,
offered telecommunications services by connecting its own equipment to
N's networks in order to connect with final subscribers. Indeed, one could
even contemplate several such service companies (S companies) connected
to N's core network, i.e., the current situation under network unbundling
arrangements in most jurisdictions.47 Such a market structure would only
develop in the presence of diseconomies of scope or scale, e.g., if the
specialized knowledge or abilities required for each task made joint
ownership and operation of these two stages of telecommunications
uneconomic. For example, the design, construction, and operation of the
core network could conceivably be so alien to the service company that the
company would choose not to build its own network, just as the company
avoids producing its own copper wire or terminal equipment.
The existence of diseconomies of scale or scope is not, however, a
sufficient condition for vertical disintegration. Instead, for separation to be
economically efficient, such diseconomies must exceed the costs of the
alternative: using contracts to organize the same activities.
N and S face a number of problems as they seek to negotiate such a
contract. First, the services involved are inherently complex. A contract
would need to address such issues as the prices for maintaining the
network, delivering network services, connecting subscriber lines, and
replacing network elements as they depreciate. It would need to specify
how S would compensate N for deploying its network to new subdivisions,
how its fees would change with inflation, and dozens of other factors
relating to marketing, service quality, prices, coordination, and so forth.
Second, the rapid pace of technological and market change would
make such a contract even more difficult to negotiate and perhaps still
more difficult to enforce. In the case of telecommunications, network
design is critically related to the services to be offered. As the market shifts
from simple analogue voice services to low-speed data services to higher-
speed data services to still higher-speed advanced services and, ultimately,
to one-way or two-way video services, the network must continually be
altered.
Third, the network design must be adjusted to competitive conditions
most aggressive mandatory unbundling rules, U.S. CLECs continue to provide
telecommunications services, primarily to small- and medium-sized businesses, indicating
that single-purpose (vertically disintegrated) entities may have some efficiency advantages
in this portion of the market. Examples of such companies are XO Communications, Cogent
Communications, and Time Warner Telecom.
47. See OECD COMMUNICATIONS OUTLOOK, supra note 6, at 27-37.
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in the downstream marketplace. For instance, as voice services shift to
wireless and Voice-over-Intemet Protocol (VoIP), or high-speed data
services gravitate to fixed or mobile wireless, the fixed-wire network must
be adjusted to deliver a larger share of video services, perhaps in high
definition. The marketing of these services may require the offering of both
wireless and fixed-wire voice, data, and video services in bundled packages
that are constantly adapting to competitive conditions and new
technologies.
Under these dynamic conditions, it is unlikely that vertically
fragmented network owners and service providers would have as strong
incentives to invest as would a vertically integrated service provider. The
knowledge and coordination required for network design and service
offerings point strongly toward vertical integration in the highly dynamic
modem telecommunications environment.48
In a similarly dynamic period of the history of automobiles, Henry
Ford integrated backward into glass and steel manufacturing because the
market was gravitating from wooden automobile bodies to much more
sophisticated welded bodies with glass windows and windshields. 49 Ford
was an innovator in materials supply as well as materials production. Once
the market for automobiles settled down into one of steel body construction
and annual volumes grew substantially, vertical integration became less
important. Over time, the Ford Motor Company-and other motor vehicle
companies-became less vertically integrated, acquiring its materials from
independent companies that were not owned by Ford or any other vehicle
producer. 50
As long as telecommunications technology and market demand for
communications services continue to change rapidly, creating the
opportunity for new and improved services, it is likely that the integration
of network owners and service providers will be required to coordinate
48. The FCC has repeatedly recognized the costs of vertical separation requirements.
See, e.g., Section 272(f)(1) Sunset of the BOC Separate Affiliate & Related Requirements,
Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 16440, para. 82
(2007) ("[Separate affiliate] restrictions not only impose additional costs, but also prevent
the BOCs from taking advantage of the economies of scope and scale associated with
integrated operation that their competitors are able to realize."); Id. at para. 83 ("These
restrictions also may prevent the BOCs and their affiliates from quickly responding to
technological and marketplace developments.... The required duplicative management of
the two affiliated companies creates unnecessary inefficiencies in decision making and may
therefore increase the costs and delay deployment of new services."); Id. at 16480 n.238
(citing previous decisions in which the FCC has reached similar conclusions).
49. For a detailed history of Ford's backward integration into the production of steel
and glass, see ALLAN NEVINS & FRANK EARNEST HILL, FORD: THE TMES, THE MAN, AND
THE COMPANY (1954).
50. See Richard N. Langlois & Paul L. Robertson, Explaining Vertical Integration:
Lessons from the American Automobile Industry, 49 J. OF EcoN. HIST. 361(1989).
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investment decisions. These investment decisions involve billions of
dollars and substantial risk that non-vertically integrated entities would be
less likely to undertake-and investors would be less likely to reward.
The imposition of functional or operational separation is likely to be
especially problematic when it comes time to make major investments in
new infrastructures, 5' such as the NGN investments now underway in many
countries to deploy fiber-to-the-node (FTTN) or fiber-to-the-home (FTTH)
infrastructures, for three reasons. First, the challenges and costs of writing
contingent contracts that efficiently share the risks and rewards of such
investments are magnified by both the size and the uncertainty of such
investments.
Second, when several competitors are attached to a given incumbent
network, each is likely to have a business plan that differs from its
competitors. For example, some competitors may choose to offer only
high-speed Internet and voice services while the incumbent prepares to
offer video services in addition to these other services. The optimal
network design for the incumbent may thus begin to differ from that
desired by these competitors. Indeed, if the incumbent changes the network
by deploying FTTH or FTTN, competitors relying more heavily on co-
locations at traditional telephone-network wire centers may be faced with
large new investments--or, as discussed below, find it uneconomical to
continue competing at all. In such an environment, each competitor has
strong incentives to influence the network operator's decisions through any
and all means, including political lobbying.
Third, one of the key benefits of vertical integration is the ability to
share knowledge between the downstream and upstream divisions-for
example, the upstream division is likely to have unique insight into the
costs of constructing an NGN, while the downstream (retail) division is
likely to have better information on the types of services consumers may
demand from the network (and their willingness to pay). So long as the
upstream and downstream functions are vertically integrated, they have
strong incentives to share this knowledge in order to achieve collective
success. Mandated separation destroys these incentives: rather than sharing
information candidly, each downstream firm instead has an incentive to
51. Among those sharing this view is former Ofcom Commissioner Kip Meek (who
negotiated the functional separation agreement between British Telecommunications (BT)
and Ofcom). See KIP MEEK, INGENIOUS CONSULTING NETWORK, OPERATIONAL SEPARATION
IN AUSTRALIA AND THE UK 24 (2008), available at
http://www.archive.dbcde.gov.au/2009/april/national-broadband-network/consultation/requ
est for submissions-on-regulatory-issues/submissions/Indigenous-consultimg-group.pdf
[hereinafter MEEK 2008] ("The demand risks and uncertainties associated with building an
NGN, especially where it is intended to replace the PSTN, seem to me to raise doubts about
whether a non-vertically integrated approach would be able to achieve the necessary level of
investment co-ordination.").
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share only that information that supports its preferred outcome.
In sum, economic theory, supported by empirical evidence from a
variety of industries,52  suggests vertical separation in the
telecommunications sector risks creating substantial problems for
innovation and investment, especially when major new infrastructure
investments are involved. The evidence discussed below suggests these
problems are in fact presenting themselves in countries that have imposed
vertical separation requirements.
IV. MANDATORY SEPARATION IN FIVE COUNTRIES
In this Section, we examine the experience to date of the five nations
that have adopted some form of forced separation in association with
mandatory unbundling of telecommunications networks. We begin with the
United Kingdom, which adopted a strong form of functional separation in
2005 and is thus widely (and correctly) regarded as the most important test
case to date.53 Next we review the experiences in four other countries that
have lately adopted some form of vertical separation: Australia, Italy, New
Zealand, and Sweden.
A. The United Kingdom
Functional separation in the United Kingdom occurred in late 2005,
when British Telecommunications (BT) agreed to the establishment of a
new and operationally distinct business division responsible for the
operation and development of BT's local access networks after a June 2005
report by independent regulator Ofcom. 5 4 To avoid referral by Ofcom to the
British High Court, BT consented to create and staff Openreach, a new
business division to operate its local access networks and to make
universally available such products as local loop unbundling and shared
loops, wholesale line rental, and backhaul products. 5  In addition,
52. See infra Section III.B.
53. See infra Section III.A.
54. See Press Release, Ofcom, A New Regulatory Approach for Fixed
Telecommunications (June 26, 2005), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/
news/2005/06/nr_20050623 [hereinafter Ofcom Press Release 2005] ("Ofcom has
concluded that a new approach is necessary for the longer term, based on real equality of
access to those parts of the fixed telecoms network which BT's competitors cannot fairly
replicate.").
55. Id.
The proposed undertakings offered by BT will stipulate the setting up of a new-
and operationally separate-business unit, provisionally entitled Access Services,
but with a distinct new brand and identity to be devised in the coming weeks. The
new business unit will be staffed by around 30,000 employees presently
responsible for the operation and development of BT's local access networks.
Id. See also Webb, supra note 7, at 144.
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Openreach adopted a policy of "product equivalence," requiring that it
support all providers' retail activities on a nondiscriminatory basis. 6
1. A New Regulator
Britain's independent telecom regulator, Ofcom, was created in 2003
to replace the former regulator, Offel 7 The new regulatory commission
quickly launched a review of the telecommunications sector and the
regulatory options before it. This review, the "Strategic Review of
Telecommunications," provided the basis for the new regulatory approach
that was launched in 2005.58
The telecommunications sector that Ofcom reviewed in 2003-05 was
very different from the U.S. telecommunications sector. First, fixed-wire
telecommunications was dominated by a single company, BT, which had
limited fixed-wire competition from noncable companies.5 9 The early entry
by cable television companies into narrowband voice services had stalled
because of the financial difficulties of the cable companies, which had
slowly been reorganized into two national companies, NTL and Telewest.
60
Eventually, these two cable companies merged into one national cable firm,
now called Virgin Media.6' There were no other major incumbent local
exchange carriers that could have contemplated entry into BT's local
.. 62 calexchange territories. The cable companies were so weak financially that
56. Ofcom Press Release 2005, supra note 54.
The new business unit will be required, through a set of formal rules on
governance and separation, to support all providers' retail activities (including
those of BT Retail) on a precisely equivalent basis, which Ofcom terms
'Equivalence of Input'. [sic] Equivalence of Input will mean that all providers will
benefit from:
* the same products, with equal opportunity to contribute to the
development of new products;
* the same prices, offered to all providers equally; and
* the same processes, to ensure all providers are able to order, install,
maintain and migrate connections for their customers on equal terms.
Id.
57. For a history of OfiCom and Oftel, consult the OfCom Web site and the links to the
legacy regulator, OfTel.. Statutory Duties and Regulatory Principles, http://www.ofcom.org.
uk/about/sdrp/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). See also Oftel Telecommunications Ofcom
British Adsl Office Regulator, http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Oftel.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2010).
58. Strategic Review Telecommunications Phase 2 Consultation Document,
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/telecoms-p2/ (documents available through
various on screen links) (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Jo Best, NTI: Telewest to Become Virgin Media, SILICON.COM (Nov. 8, 2006),
available at http://www.silicon.com/technology/networks/2006/11/08/ntltelewest-to-become
-virgin-media-39163928/.
62. See Jason Whalley and Peter Curwen, Is Functional Separation BT-Style the
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they had been unable to launch a major assault on the broadband market.63
By the middle of 2003, the cable companies had only 1.8 subscribers per
100 UK residents, compared with 4.8 cable modem subscribers per 100
residents in the United States at that time. 64
2. A New Policy: Functional Separation
While the structural conditions in the United Kingdom's telecom
markets in 2003-05 were less conducive to competition than those in the
United States, Ofcom's basis for its decision to alter dramatically the
United Kingdom's regulatory paradigm was surprisingly weak. In the
Phase 2 Consultation Document of the Strategic Telecommunications
Policy Review, released in late 2004, Ofcom focused almost entirely on the
broadband market.65 Its clear conclusion was that there was insufficient
intra-platform and inter-platform competition in the United Kingdom, and
that Ofcom could not effectively address the latter problem. 66 Therefore, it
would be forced to construct a more aggressive policy of mandating equal
access to BT's broadband facilities through wholesale unbundling
regulation. Ofcom felt that the only other alternative was a full structural
separation of BT's wholesale and retail activities.67
Ultimately, Ofcom pressed BT to guarantee competitors access to its
network facilities on an Equivalence of Inputs basis.6 In June 2005, BT
announced that it would agree to provide such a guarantee. 69 After further
Answer?, COMMS. & STRATEGIES, 2008, at 145, 147-48.
63. Id.
64. FCC, High Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of June 30, 2003, Industry
Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Dec. 2003, tbl. 1; ECTA,
Broadband Scorecard, June 2003.
65. See OFCOM, STRATEGIC REVIEW OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHASE 2 CONSULTATION
DOCUMENT (2004), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/telecoms-p2/
tsrphase2/annexO.pdf [hereinafter OFCOM REPORT 2004].
66. Meek indicates that unique aspects of Ofcom's statutory authority made it "at
minimum cumbersome" for Ofcom to impose behavioral regulation, thus making vertical
separation a relatively more attractive option. MEEK 2008, supra note 51, at 8.
67. Ofcom was quite vague in describing its negative view of cable competition in
written documents. It opined in its Phase 2 Consultation document, OFCOM REPORT 2004,
supra note 65:
the technology shift to IP-based networks requires new investment, to supply what
are likely to be products with lower margin than was available in the legacy
products and services. There is little appetite for new investment to compete with
BT Group plc at the local access level, and in some areas even in backhaul from
the Local Exchange to the core network. This is a challenge.
68. The Phase 2 Consultation Document offered the following observation: "On the
final question posed - whether structural or operational separation of BT Group plc, or full
functional equivalence, still remained relevant issues - the answer from the Phase 1
consultation was that, yes, they were still relevant; more so perhaps than we had
anticipated." Id.
69. See OFCOM, UNDERTAKINGS GIVEN TO OFCOM BY BT PURSUANT TO THE ENTERPRISE
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negotiations with Ofcom, BT agreed to institute a functional separation of
its facilities into separate wholesale and retail divisions, and to guarantee
that it would provide entrants with access to services or inputs in which it
had significant market power that would be the same as that provided to its
own retail operations.70 As a result of this agreement, BT established
Openreach, which provides these wholesale services to entrants and to its
own retail operations.71
There was very little analysis of the development of broadband in the
United Kingdom through 2004 in the Ofcom documents. Ofcom's decision
instead was based largely on a comparison of broadband penetration across
a few countries, as portrayed in Figure 1 of Annex 0 of its Report:72
Figure 1:
Ofcom's Broadband Penetration Chart
Figure 1: Broadband internet penetration
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From this crude graph, Ofcom was able to opine that
[o]f the countries under consideration, Japan and the US can be
considered [to be] in the 'second tier' in terms of broadband
penetration with take-up in the UK similar to that in France and
Germany. More recent data for Europe show that the UK now ranks
above Germany in terms of penetration but remains slightly below
France where growth in the number of unbundled local loops and
improved availability of lower speed entry level products has helped
boost penetration.73
Ofcom provided no analysis of the recent trajectory of broadband in the
United Kingdom, nor did it undertake to analyze the sources of its growth.
Had Ofcom looked more closely, it would have discovered that broadband
ACT OF 2002 (2005), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/btundertakings/
consolidated.pdf.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. OFCOM REPORT 2004, supra note 65, at 2.
73. Id. at para. 0.7.
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was growing more rapidly in the United Kingdom than in France or in the
EU-15 in general, and that much of this growth was coming from DSL
services based on BT's existing wholesale offerings.7 4 At the end of 2005,
only five EU countries were measurably ahead of the United Kingdom in
broadband penetration: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and
Sweden. 75 Thus, whatever problems Ofcom's new policy sought to address,
there certainly was no evidence that the United Kingdom was falling
measurably behind with respect to Internet availability or uptake.
B. Australia
In September 2005, as part of a broader effort to increase competition
based on unbundled loops, the Australian government ordered incumbent
telecommunications carrier Telstra to submit a plan for operational
separation to be approved by the Communication Minister. 6 Government
officials sought separation as a remedy to the operation of Telstra's
wholesale division in a manner that allegedly favored Telstra's retail
business at the expense of wholesale customers.77 On June 23, 2006, the
Minister approved a plan which called for the company to maintain
separate retail, wholesale, and network service business units. 8 Employees
working in Telstra's retail division were specifically barred from working
in its wholesale unit and vice versa,7 9 and Telstra's retail business units
were prohibited from exercising control over the marketing, contracting, or
supply of services to wholesale customers.80 However, although a separate
74. ECTA data for 2002-11I and 2005-III, available at www.ectaportal.com.
75. Based on data compiled by the European Competitive Telecommunications
Association (ECTA). See OECD Broadband Portal, supra note 75.
76. Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer Issues)
Act, 2005, no. 119 (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/
Act 1.nsf/0/EF7D9BB244FFE2F6CA25713A001E26C8/$file/1 19-2005.pdf.
77. Press Release, Senator the Hon. Helen Coonan, Minister for Communications,
Information Technology, and the Arts (June 23, 2006), available at
http://www.minister.dcita.gov.au/coonan/media/media-releases/telstrasuoperational-separat
ion_planapproved.
Telstra is required to establish and maintain within the company separate
wholesale, retail and key network services business units. This is designed to
prevent the internal functions that Telstra's wholesale customers rely upon to
compete effectively with Telstra from being operated in a way that systematically
advantages Telstra's retail business.
Id.
78. See Id.
79. See id. (.'In fact, Telstra is now required to have separate staff and separate
premises for the Telstra wholesale and Telstra retail business units. Anyone who works for
Telstra retail unit can no longer work for the wholesale unit."') (internal quotations
included).
80. Operational Seperation, Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital
Economy Archive Site, http://www.archive.dcita.gov.au/2007/1 1/connect-australia/
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL
wholesale division was created to serve competitors, the rest of Telstra was
left intact as an integrated wholesale and retail operator, and Telstra's
nondiscrimination obligations were defined on an equivalence of outputs
basis.1
C. Italy
Vertical separation in Italy began in 2002 with the release of
Resolution No. 152/02/CONS, by Agcom, the independent Italian
Communications Regulatory Authority.82 Agcom identified incumbent
Telecom Italia (TI) as an operator with significant market power in fixed
telephony 3 and sought to grant equivalency of access of its network
services to competitors. 84 Agcom directed TI to implement "administrative
separation," which resulted in the creation of TI Retail and TI Wholesale as
distinct business units.85 TI Wholesale was responsible for the provision of
network access and services to competitors.86 Unlike models of functional
separation in other countries, the Italian model allowed TI to retain core
network and access services within the same operational division.87
operational-separation (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) ("Telstra's retail business units must
have no control over, or responsibility for, the marketing, contracting or supply of services
to wholesale customers.").
81. Webb, supra note 7, at 145.
82. Telecom Italia's Undertakings: Building Up on Operational Separation Model,
Presentation at the Workshop on "Models of Network Separation" in London, Slide 10
(Mar. 6, 2009), power point presentation available at http://www.telecomitalia.it/
content/dam/telecomitalia/it/archivio/documenti/lnvestitori/Presentazioni/Investor Relation
s/2009/TUndertaking_presentation for workshopLondon_6march09.pdf. In addition,
see Italian Communications Authority Web Site, http://www2.agcom.it/eng/engintro.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010) ("The Communications Regulatory Authority (Agcom) is an
independent authority, established by Law n. 249 of 31 July 1997.... to ensure equitable
conditions for fair market competition."). See also Webb supra note 7.
83. Resolution on Measures To Ensure the Full Application of the Principle of Internal
and External Equal Treatment by Operators With Significant Market Power in Fixed
Telephony, ITALIAN AGCOM Doc. 152/02/CONS (2002), available at http://www2.agcom.it/
eng/resolutions/2002/dl52 02 CONS.pdf ("Telecom Italia currently is an operator with
significant market power in the market for fixed public telephony network and services, in
the market for leased lines systems, in the national interconnection market.").
84. Id.
[Tjhe Authority started a preliminary investigation to assess the opportunity to
take steps to ensure compliance with the requirement of internal and external
equal treatment, more specifically in relation to the provision of intermediate
services to Telecom Italia's competitors and the concurrent presence of the latter
company in the market for finished products developed by Telecom Italia's
competitors purchasing the foregoing intermediate services...
Id. at para. 1.
85. Webb, supra note 7, at 145.
86. Id.
87. Id. See also Barbara Esbin, Functional Separation, Italian Style, PRoGREss ON
POINT, at 7-8 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.pff.org/issuespubs/pops/2009/popl6.9
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In May 2007, Agcom undertook a public consultation on functional
separation and also proposed legislation that would allow it to impose
functional separation on firms with significant market power.88 TI, in what
the ITU labeled "an apparent attempt to appease Agcom, ''89 responded by
creating a new and completely autonomous business unit, called Open
Access, which was announced in February 200890 and approved by Agcom
in December 2008.91 While TI has characterized Open Access as
"operational" separation, it is in many respects similar in structure to BT's
Openreach, including the creation of an "Equal Access Board" to oversee
compliance with nondiscrimination.92 Unlike Openreach, however, Open
Access does not have a separate board of directors.
93
D. New Zealand
Functional separation in New Zealand came quickly on the heels of
BT's reorganization in the United Kingdom. In 2006, New Zealand's
parliament passed into law the Telecommunications Amendment Act (No.
2) 2006, in which the Minister of Communications ordered the
reorganization of Telecom New Zealand (TNZ).94 TNZ agreed to split into
three separate divisions-retail, network, and wholesale-that would
operate at arm's length from one another.95 "Separation Day" for TNZ
occurred on March 31, 2008,96 and the process is set to be completed
formally by 2012.97 As in the United Kingdom, the primary thrust of the
functionalseparationitalian.pdf.
88. Webb, supra note 7, at 145.
89. Id.
90. Global Insight, Telecom Italia Caves in to Functional Separation, Feb. 14, 2008,
available at http://www.globalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail 11538.htm.
91. Giovanni Battista Amendola, Telecom Italia, Power Point Presentation at the
Workshop on Policy for Next Generation Networks: European and US Perspectives at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge (Mar. 27, 2009), available at
http://cfp.mit.edu/groups/INTERCONNECTIONWGDOCS/March-27-2009/Amendola%
20MIT %200perational SeparationFinal.PPT.
92. See Esbin, supra note 87, at 7-8.
93. Id.
94. Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006, 2006 No 83 (N.Z.).
95. Cath Hart, Telecom NZ in Three Degrees of Separation, THE AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 1,
2008, available at www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23462905-20142,00.html
("Under the new arrangements, TNZ will keep its retail, network and wholesale operations
at arm's-length from one another, in a model similar to that used by British Telecom when it
separated its network and wholesale operations in 2005.").
96. Operational Separation of Telecom, www.med.govt.nz/templates/Content
TopicSummary 263 10.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
97. Marta lenco, Senior Consultant, Ovum Consulting, A Review of
Functional/Structural Separation Models around the World, ITU Centres of Excellence
Training Workshop on "Infrastructure Sharing Potential- Consideration of Separation
Models" in Athens, Slide 9, power point presentation available at
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functional separation of TNZ was to impose nondiscriminatory access to
wholesale telecommunications services for TNZ's competitors.98
E. Sweden
In 2007, the Swedish Post and Telecom Agency (PTS) proposed
legislation that would give it the authority to impose functional separation
on incumbent TeliaSonera.99 The PTS justified the proposal on the basis
that there was "[d]eep mistrust" between TeliaSonera and its wholesale
customers, "[r]epeated disputes and long court proceedings," and various
forms of alleged discrimination.'00 Despite these problems, however,
TeliaSonera had a retail market share of only fifty-seven percent of DSL
connections (the remainder being served by its wholesale customers); 10 1
and its overall market share was only thirty-six percent, since DSL
represented only sixty-three percent of broadband connections, with the
remainder being supplied by cable (twenty-one percent) and municipal
fiber (sixteen percent). 0 2 In terms of availability, the cable infrastructure
reached sixty percent of premises, and FTTH networks reached
approximately thirty percent.0 3
PTS' proposed legislation was adopted by the Swedish Parliament in
June 2008 and took effect on July 1, 2008.1' To date, PTS has not formally
imposed a functional separation requirement on TeliaSonera, but it has
undertaken analyses of access network markets, and indicated it is
continuing to consider adopting a formal rule.10 5
http://about.ovum.com/consulting/telecomsregulation/thoughtleadership/thoughtleadershipl.
pdf,Slide 9.
98. Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 2) 2006, 2006 No 83 § 69E (N.Z.)
("Section 69D(1)(f) requires equivalence of supply of wholesale telecommunications
services and access to Telecom's network so that third party access seekers are treated in the
same or an equivalent way to Telecom's own business operations, including in relation to
pricing, procedures, operational support, supply of information, and other relevant
matters.").
99. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
100. See Bo Andersson, Swedish Post and Telecom Agency (PTS), Functional
Separation in Sweden - New Remedy in the Electronic Communications Act, PowerPoint
Presentation at the 3rd International Conference on Broadband Internet (June 7, 2008),
available at www.eett.gr/conference2008/pdf/Andersson.pdf.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. SWEDISH POST & TELECOM AGENCY (PTS), STRATEGIC AGENDA 2009, at 28 (Report
No. PTS-ER-2008:19, 2008), available at www.pts.se/upload/Rapporter/OmPTS/Strategisk
%20Agenda%202009_eng.pdf.
105. SWEDISH POST & TELECOM AGENCY (PTS), STRATEGIC AGENDA 2010, at 47-48
(Report No. PTS-ER-2009:27, 2009), available at http://www.pts.se/upload/Rapporter/Om-
PTS/strategic-agenda-2010-pts-er-2009-27.pdf.
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Even before passage of the legislation, however, TeliaSonera
"voluntarily" created a functionally separated access company, TeliaSonera
Skanova Access AB (Skanova), which began operations on January 1,
2008.106 Skanova is a wholly owned but independently operated network
infrastructure company, which leases access to TeliaSonera's network
assets on equal terms to both TeliaSonera's retail operations and to its
wholesale customers, under the oversight of an "Equality Access Board,"
which is tasked with ensuring equal treatment and independence.107 Thus,
while the PTS has yet to formally impose a functional separation
requirement, as a practical matter, functional separation was adopted in
January 2008.
V. EARLY EVIDENCE: THE EFFECTS OF VERTICAL SEPARATION
ON BROADBAND PENETRATION AND INVESTMENT
While it may be too early to provide a comprehensive evaluation of
the experience of these five countries with functional/operational
separation, we can provide some evidence on two important metrics: (1)
the growth of broadband penetration and (2) network investment and fiber
deployment. We find that vertical separation has not had measurable
positive effects on either metric; to the contrary, the early evidence
suggests the growth of broadband penetration has slowed in countries
which have adopted vertical separation and that investment, especially with
respect to NGN fiber networks, has been deterred.
A. Broadband Growth
The most obvious indicator of the success or failure of a policy
designed to provide broadband competitors with access to the incumbent's
facilities at nondiscriminatory rates would be a surge in broadband
subscription growth due to the increase in competition. Because the UK
policy has been in effect longer than the separation policies of the other
four countries, we can provide greater detail on its effect. We therefore
begin with the United Kingdom and then turn to a necessarily more cursory
analysis of the other four countries' experiences.'
08
106. Id. at 48 ("The statutory amendment also provides regulatory authorities with the
possibility to accept a voluntary commitment concerning functional separation. TeliaSonera
formed a subsidiary company, Skanova Access, whose main task is to supply copper access
lines on non-discriminatory terms.").
107. Andersson, supra note 100. See also Press Release, TeliaSonera, Skanova Access
Meets Swedish Telecom Operators' Infrastructure Needs on Equal Terms (Dec. 27, 2007),
available at http://www.cisionwire.com/teliasonera/skanova-access-meets-swedish-telecom-
operators--infrastructure-needs-on-equal-terms-.
108. Our analysis obviously is qualitative and does not formally correct for exogenous
policy or other factors that may have affected outcomes, such as changes in the terms and
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1. Broadband Growth in the United Kingdom
If broadband had been languishing in the United Kingdom because of
a lack of competition from resellers or other DSL providers using BT
loops, one might expect the change in policy in the third quarter of 2005 to
correct this deficiency. As entrants took advantage of the availability of
BT's new wholesale offerings and BT's mandated nondiscrimination
against competitors, entrant-supplied broadband lines should have
increased according to the Ofcom theory' °9-perhaps dramatically. But no
such event occurred.
To the contrary, broadband line growth actually decelerated after the
adoption of functional separation. Between the third quarter 2005 and third
quarter 2008, according to ECTA data, UK broadband lines increased from
8.9 million to 16.9 million, an annual rate of increase of 21 percent."l 0
However, broadband lines had been increasing by more than 50 percent per
year before third quarter 2005."' Moreover, BT's retail lines have been
growing more rapidly than its competitors' lines since third quarter 2005,' 12
despite the new liberalized wholesale regime.13
A comparison of UK broadband growth with growth in the EU-15
yields a similarly bleak conclusion about the effects of functional
separation. According to ECTA data, between September 2002 and
September 2005, when the new Ofcom policy went into effect, UK
broadband lines increased at an annual rate of seventy-six percent while
EU- 15 broadband lines rose at a rate of fifty-four percent. 14 Thus, prior to
the change in policy, the rate of increase in UK broadband lines was forty-
rates for leasing of wholesale services. For example, the 2008-09 decision by BT to
announce accelerated deployment of its FTTC product is attributed by most analysts to more
favorable wholesale terms granted by Ofcom. See Jennifer Schenker, BT Rolls Out a
Massive Fiber Network, Bus. WK., July 15, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.
com/globalbiz/content/jul2008/gb20080715_837495.htm?chan=search.
109. See Ofcom Press Release 2005, supra note 54.
110. Data Compilations (detailed spreadsheets of data compilation on file with the
author and the Federal Communications Law Journal) [hereinafter Data Compilations]; see
also European Competitive Telecomms. Assoc. (ECTA), Broadband Scorecard,
http://www.ectaportal.com/en/REPORTS/Broadband-Scorecards/Broadband-Scorecard-
2008/.
111. Data Compilations, supra note 110.
112. Id.
113. See also eCommunications: Implementation and Enforcement of the Current Rules,
Europa Information Society, http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/policy/ecomm/
implementationenforcement/indexen.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). These data are
virtually identical to the ECTA data, differing only slightly because the months used for
reporting are slightly different, i.e., September vs. October. See also Data Compilations,
supra note 110.
114. Data Compilations, supra note 110.
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one percent greater than the rate of increase in the EU-15.5 In the three
years following the implementation of the new Ofcom policy, UK
broadband line growth fell to twenty-one percent, and EU-15 broadband
line growth fell to twenty-three percent." 6 (See Figure 2 below.) Thus, the
new policy has been associated with a severe decline in UK growth relative
to the growth in the EU-15. Indeed, the UK broadband growth rate is now
less than the average rate for the entire EU-15, and broadband penetration
in the United Kingdom has fallen relative to EU-15 penetration in the three
years that the policy has been in place"17
Figure 2
Annual Growth in UK and EU-15 Broadband Three Years
Before and After the New OfCom Policy
80%
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2. Broadband Growth in Australia, Italy, New Zealand, and
Sweden
In three of the four other countries where vertical separation has been
implemented-Australia, Italy, and New Zealand-broadband growth was
greater than the OECD average at the time the new policy was under
discussion and ultimately implemented, but subsequently subsided to be
approximately equal to, or even somewhat below, the OECD average. 1 8 In
Sweden, broadband penetration has been consistently above the OECD
average and continues to grow as rapidly as the OECD average, despite the
115. Id.
116. Id. The most recent ECTA data are for the third quarter of 2008.
117. Id.
118. See OECD Broadband Portal, supra note 75.
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maturity of the Swedish market. " 9
Figure 3120 shows the broadband penetration in each country using a
logarithmic scale on the vertical axis: the slope of each curve thus reflects
the growth rate in broadband penetration. As shown by the fact that the
lines become flatter over time, each country's growth rate slowed in recent
years despite (or perhaps because of) the threat or reality of vertical
separation. Sweden, on the other hand, remains substantially above the
OECD average, 121 but the growth of Swedish broadband appears to have
been unaffected by policy changes.
Figure 3
Broadband Penetration, 2001-08
Source: OECD
In fact, if one plots the growth of broadband across most of the major
OECD countries, one observes a convergence in both the level and the rate
of growth of broadband penetration, as shown in Figure 4.122 Still, however,
four of the five countries with vertical separation-Australia, Italy, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom-remain at or near the bottom in terms
of broadband penetration. Their new vertical separation policies have not
resulted in more rapid broadband growth.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Data Compilations, supra note 110.
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Figure 4
Broadband Penetration, 2001-08
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B. Network Investment and Fiber Deployment
In recent years, incumbents in Japan, Korea, and the United States
have embarked on major programs to deploy FTTH so as to be able to offer
video and super-fast broadband connections.1 23 Likewise, significant fiber
deployments are also underway in a handful of European countries.
124
However, incumbent carriers generally are not deploying FTTH
infrastructures, especially in countries that have imposed mandatory
vertical separation,' 25 suggesting that such deployments are indeed being
hampered by mandatory separation. Moreover, the governments of three of
the five countries-the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand--
123. OECD Broadband Portal, supra note 75.
124. Id.
125. For example, all EU-15 countries must mandate network unbundling. According to
the latest ECTA data for 2009-4, the number of incumbent-carrier fiber connections was
108,554 across a region with a population of 380 million. See Broadband Scorecard 2009,
http://www.ectaportal.com/en/REPORTS/Broadband-Scorecards/Broadband-Scorecard-
2009/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). In the United States, Verizon alone reported 2.8 million
FiOS (FTTH) Internet subscribers in the first quarter of 2009. See Verizon
Communications, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Mar. 31. 2009), available at
http://investor.verizon.com/sec/see-frame.aspx?FilinglD=6595700&haspdf=&hasxls=1&h
asxbrl=0&xbrlUrl=#.
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recently have announced plans to spend billions of public dollars to
subsidize deployment of NGN broadband infrastructures, even in non-rural
areas,126 suggesting that mandatory separation has reduced private
incentives to invest in NGN infrastructure sufficiently to require large
public subsidies.
1. Network Investment and Fiber Deployment in the United
Kingdom
In public presentations, Ofcom officials often claim that capital
spending by BT is greater than that of all other EU- 15 incumbent telephone
companies, 127 thereby suggesting that Ofcom's policy has actually
encouraged capital spending by BT. While this assertion is not quite
correct, 128 it is indeed true that BT's capital expenditures per line or per
unit revenue are among the highest in the EU-i5129 though they are
substantially below those of the two large U.S. incumbent carriers. BT
reported that its capital expenditures were 15.7 percent of revenues for the
fiscal year ending March 31, 2 0 08 .30 By contrast, in 2007, Verizon and
AT&T invested more than twenty percent of revenues in their fixed-wire
operations."1
Among the eleven EU-15 incumbents that break out their fixed-wire
and wireless spending, BT ranks second in capital spending per dollar of
revenues. Much of this expenditure may simply reflect the dreadful
condition of BT's network at the end of the twentieth century. Capital
spending by all carriers declined substantially after the telecom stock
market bubble burst in 2001. Since 2003, when telecom capital
126. See supra notes, 113, 122, 124 and accompanying text.
127. For example, as early as 2004, OfCom published BT's assertion that "BT already
invests a higher proportion of its turnover than any other major European telco." BT,
Investment & Innovation: creating a competitive advantage for the UK, BT's Response to
Phase 1 Consultation Document (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/
consult/condocs/telecoms_review 1/responses/a h/bt.pdf.
128. Data Compilation, supra note 110.
129. Id.
130. See BT Group PLC Annual Report 2008, http://www.btplc.com/report/
Report08/Financialstatements/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
131. All data are from the companies' annual financial reports. It is necessary to
eliminate Verizon's and AT&T's wireless spending in order to compare their spending with
BT's capital expenditures. BT spun off its wireless operations in 2001. BT Group- Business
Review Restructuring, http://www.btplc.com/report/businessrestructure.shtml (last visited
Apr. 10, 2010).
132. Data derived from the annual financial reports of Telekom Austria, Belgacom,
British Telecom, Deutsche Telecom, KPN, OTE (Greece), Portugal Telecom, TDC, Telia-
Sonera, Telecom Italia, and Telefonica in 2006. By 2008, only seven of these companies
reported separate wireless and wireline capital spending, and BT had dropped to third place
in capex/revenues among these seven companies. Data Compilation, supra note 110.
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expenditures reached their recent nadir, BT's capital spending has risen by
thirty-three percent and by twenty-eight percent in U.S. dollars (ppp).133 By
contrast, the average spending by twelve EU-15 incumbent carriers for
which data are available rose by forty-nine percent in U.S. dollars (ppp).134
Recent data for EU carriers' fixed-wire operations are often not
reported, but BT's capital spending growth since 2005 is not generally
above that of the largest carriers for which data are available. Between
2005 and 2007, BT's capital spending rose by ten percent. 135 By contrast,
between 2005 and 2007, fixed-wire capital expenditures rose by eighteen
percent at Telef6nica and seventeen percent at Deutsche Telekom, while
declining by three percent at Telecom Italia.1 36 In short, there is no
evidence that BT's capital spending has risen relative to other carriers since
the change in regulatory policy in the United Kingdom.
With respect to fiber deployment, the United Kingdom is lagging
behind many European countries as well as leaders like Japan, Korea, and
the United States, a fact which has been recognized by Ofcom since at least
2007,137 and which was emphasized by the Brown Government's June 2009
Digital Britain report, which concluded the following:
Policies of the last 25 years have injected competition to the market
and extracted value from the infrastructure. We have over this period
seen significant investments in successive generations of mobile
networks and the cable network. But in other infrastructures, and in
particular the copper fixed telecoms network, the competitive market
has delivered significant upgrades in performance, but not the massive
investment required to redevelop the fundamentals of network
infrastructure. "'
While Ofcom attributes this lag to a variety of factors-none of which
implicate its mandatory separation regime' 39 -two facts are unavoidable.
133. See Annual Report & Summary Financial Statement, http://www.btplc.com/
sharesandperformance/annualreportandreview/annualreportandreview.htm (last visited Apr.
10, 2010). All BT data are for the year ending the following March 31. Thus, this
calculation is based on the change in capital spending for the years ending March 31, 2004
and March 31, 2008. All other carriers' data are for calendar years.
134. See supra, note 94.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. OFCOM, FUTURE BROADBAND: POLICY APPROACH TO NEXT GENERATION ACCESS
CONSULTATION, at 26 (2007), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/
nga/fiturebroadband nga.pdf [hereinafter OFCOM SEPTEMBER 2007 REPORT] ("From this
assessment of the UK's specific situation, it appears likely that the UK will witness later
deployment of large scale next generation access networks than some other countries.").
138. DEP'T FOR CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT & DEP'T FOR Bus., INNOVATION & SKILLS,
DIGITAL BRITAIN: FINAL REPORT, 2009, Cm. 7650, at 47, available at
http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/digitalbritain-finalreport-jun09.pdf
(emphasis added) [hereinafter DIGrAL BRITAIN].
139. See OFCOM SEPTEMBER 2007 REPORT, supra note 137, at 21.
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First, the cable and wireless sectors have not been subjected to the same
types of unbundling and mandatory separation regimes that have been
applied to BT's fixed wireline network, and both sectors are investing
heavily in infrastructure-most notably Virgin Media, which, as the Digital
Britain report notes, is in the process of rolling out 50 Mbps service
throughout its national cable network, covering fifty percent of UK
homes. 1
40
Second, both Ofcom and BT have spent a tremendous amount of time
and energy over the past few years grappling with precisely the sorts of
issues theory suggests would prove problematic in a vertically separated
environment: how to deploy a next generation network in a manner that is
"competitively neutral" among the various resellers. 41 Faced with demands
from different types of resellers for different types of mandatory access,
Ofcom has been decidedly indecisive. On the one hand, in March 2009, it
stated firmly that "[w]e are not going to protect existing business models at
the expense of future developments and new services for consumers."' 42 At
the same time, however, Ofcom promises to protect consumers from
"forced migration, the removal of existing retail products and negative
impact on competition" that might result from the transition to NGN
networks. 43 Of course, each competitor who might potentially be harmed
by a transition will argue precisely these points, i.e., the harm that would be
done to its consumers if it were forced to alter its business plans to
accommodate a new technology.
Ofcom's March 2009 statement also focused on the likelihood that,
due to network architecture issues we discuss further below, network
sharing arrangements in an NGN environment are likely to be "active" (i.e.,
involving the use of shared electronics) rather than "passive" (i.e.,
involving only the sharing of physical infrastructure such as the last-mile
loop). 44 But Ofcom conceded that active sharing poses difficult challenges
associated with standardization, that negotiations among industry
140. DIGITAL BRITAIN, supra note 148, at 13.
141. See OFCOM SEPTEMBER 2007 REPORT, supra note 137. See also OFCOM, NEXT
GENERATION NEW BUILD: PROMOTING HIGHER SPEED BROADBAND IN NEW BUILD HOUSING
DEVELOPMENTS (2008), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/
newbuild/condoc.pdf; Chinyelu Onwurah, INFRASTRUCTURE SHARING - PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN NEXT GENERATION FIXED ACCESS (January 2008), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/discussnga/presspeech/infra.pdf. More recent activities
are discussed immediately below. Competitive neutrality is a central theme throughout
these consultations and presentations.
142. OFCOM, DELIVERING SUPER-FAST BROADBAND IN THE UK: PROMOTING INVESTMENT
AND COMPETITION STATEMENT, 63-64 (2009), www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/nga.
futurebroadband/statement/statement.pdf.
143. Id. at 64.
144. Id. at 30-36.
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participants (i.e., between BT and its downstream customers) may prove
unsuccessful in resolving these issues, that as a result Ofcom might be
forced to set detailed technological specifications, and that, even so, "there
remains a risk that active products will not satisfy competitors'
requirements.' 45 In June 2009, Ofcom modified its network unbundling
requirements for BT's deployment of fiber-to-the-cabinet (FTTC)
technology. 46 It will now allow Openreach to control the electronic
equipment required to operate the FTTC product as long as BT commits to
passing 500,000 homes with FTTC by the end of 2010.147 In the past,
Openreach simply offered passive last-mile connections, but Ofcom
decided to change its rules for FTTC in order to encourage the FTTC
rollout. 48 It has also launched a new consultation on the regulation of
NGN, perhaps in response to the rather gloomy assessment of the prospects
for BT's fixed network provided by the Digital Britain report.
149
In March 2010, Ofcom offered its latest regulatory approach to
network sharing of next generation networks, such as FTTC. It proposes to
require BT to share its new FTTC network but only on a "virtual" basis,
presumably because it can be difficult to share fiber-optic lines. Thus, BT
would have to provide competitors with "a virtual connection that gives
145. Id. at 35.
146. OFCOM, VARIATION To BT's UNDERTAKINGS UNDER THE ENTERPRISE ACT 2002
RELATED TO FIBRE-TO-THE-CABINET STATEMENT 1 (2009), available at http://ofcom.org.uk/
consult/condocs/fttc/statement/.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. In July 2009, BT announced it would pass up to one million homes with FTTC or
FTTH broadband by early 2010, a significant increase over its previous plans. Ray Le
Maistre, BT Ramps Its FTTx Plans, LIGHT READING EUROPE, July 9, 2009,
http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?docid=179019. BT continued making
announcements increasing its rollout targets throughout late 2009 and into early 2010. See
e.g,.Chris Williams, BT Names 63 More Exchanges for Fibre Upgrades, THE REGISTER (Jan.
6, 2010), available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/01/06/btupgrades/. As of early
2010 the company had not provided any evidence of having met the one million premises
commitment, though it said it would pass four million premises by year end. See BT Group
plc, Q3 2009/10 Results, at 11 (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.btplc.com/
Sharesandperformance/Quarterlyresults/Financialpresentations/q3 1 Oslides.pdf. Given the
"stop-start" history of BT's recent fiber deployment plans, however, there is reason for
skepticism regarding such commitments. See, e.g., OFcoM, NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS:
RESPONDING TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS, PROMOTE EFFECTIVE
COMPETITION AND SECURE EFFICIENT INVESTMENT 3 (2009), available at www.ofcom.org.uk/
consult/condocs/ngndevelopments/main.pdf.
For the past five years, since BT announced its intention to build 21CN [its
proposed next generation fiber network], the expectation has been that in the not
too distant future, BT would replace its Public Switched Telephone Network
("PSTN") in its entirety. Following a strategic review of its plans for 21CN, BT
has decided to step back from this vision of a complete replacement of its
PSTN.... This change in outlook has created considerable uncertainty.
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OCPs a dedicated link to their customers and substantial control."' 50
In the meantime, the government has now proposed a new 50p per
line tax on fixed-line telephone service in order to support a Next
Generation Fund that will provide public funding for NGN deployment to
as much as a third of the country.' 5' The Fund would "ensure a coherent
framework for network designs, operating systems, common processes and
regulatory requirements so the next generation access networks across the
country work as effectively as possible for all parties.'1
52
In short, while other nations are rolling out FTTH infrastructures, and
its own cable operator is deploying DOCSIS 3.0, the United Kingdom's
plans for upgrading the traditional wireline network are dependent on the
outcome of a long and difficult negotiation among BT and its downstream
retail customers, with Ofcom (and perhaps now the government's Next
Generation Fund) serving as mediator and referee, for which there is no
certainty of success or even completion. These are precisely the sorts of
transaction costs economists have in mind when describing the economic
efficiency benefits of vertical integration and, conversely, precisely the
sorts of difficulties we would expect to find when vertical disintegration is
mandated.
2. Network Investment and Fiber Deployment in Australia, Italy,
New Zealand, and Sweden
While there are many differences between the regulatory regimes and
market circumstances in Australia, Italy, New Zealand, and Sweden, one
thing all four countries have in common is that their incumbent, vertically
separated telephone companies are not actively rolling out last-mile fiber
infrastructures.
To be sure, most EU incumbents are not actively deploying fiber, with
the primary exceptions being TeliaSonera (in Finland), France Telecom,
15 3
T-Com (Slovakia), and Telef6nica (Spain), but these deployments still
account for less than fifteen percent of the homes/buildings passed by
FTTH systems in the European Union. 54 A recent tabulation of fiber
150. OFCOM, Review of the Wholesale Local Access Market, Mar. 23, 2010, at 4.
151. DIGITAL BRITAIN, supra note 138, at 65.
152. Id.
153. France Telecom has begun a modest rollout of fiber, apparently in Paris, but the
principal supplier of FTTH services in France is the cable company, Numericable, which is
not subject to telecom regulation. Numericable had passed an estimated 4.4 million homes
by December 2009, according to IDATE, while France Telecom had passed just 570,000.
FTTx 2010 MARKETS & TRENDS, FACTS & FIGURES 20-28 (2010), available at
http://www.idate.org/2009/pages/download.php?id= 112&t=f_telech_actu&fic=FTTx_2010
IDATE.pdf&repertoire=news/502_FTrH Summit [hereinafter IDATE 2010].
154. Id. (showing incumbents have deployed 2.86 million out of 20.93 million fiber
lines, or 14.8 percent).
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deployments in Europe by IDATE shows that the fiber deployments in the
European Union are generally being undertaken by public authorities, cable
companies, electric utilities, or new competitive carriers, not the incumbent
carriers.155
The two incumbents that have succumbed to functional separation-
TeliaSonera and Telecom Italia-have not yet begun to roll out fiber to the
premises. While TeliaSonera began to roll out fiber to the home in fifteen
major cities in Finland in 2007, it has not launched a similar program in
Sweden.' 56 Nor has Telecom Italia begun to deploy fiber to the premises. In
Italy, FTTH is being deployed aggressively by a non-incumbent carrier,
Fastweb, which is owned by a non-EU incumbent, Swisscom,157 which is
thus doubly insulated from the European Union's penchant for promoting
functional/structural separation.
In Australia, the imposition of operational separation was an integral
part of what has become a four-year regulatory tug-of-war between
incumbent Telstra, on the one hand, and the Australian Consumer and
Competition Commission (ACCC) and Department of Broadband
Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE), on the other. The
central issue in the debate has been the ACCC's insistence on an aggressive
program of local loop unbundling (ULL) 158 and its unwillingness (or
155. Press Release, IDATE, Inventory of FTIH in Europe: Situation in Eastern Europe
and the Middle East (Feb. 11, 2009), available at www.tendencias21.net/
attachment/126087/. Notably, Telefonica decided to begin rolling out a new FTTH only
when its regulator apparently provided it with assurances that Telef6nica would not be
subjected to intrusive regulation of its new fiber facilities. In its 2008 Annual Report,
Telef6nica noted that
[als for broadband, 2008 marked the definition of the regulatory framework
applicable to the rollout of new generation access networks using optic fiber and
the services provided over them, enabling the launch at year-end of a new family
of Future services. Among the noteworthy principles established by the sector
watchdog in the regulations governing the new generation networks (NGNs) is the
express acknowledgement that to foster investment and innovation, NGN
regulations need to differ significantly from the rules governing copper networks.
TELEF6NICA, 2008 FINANcIAL REPORT 113 (2008), available at
http://publicaciones.telefonica.com/mpdNisor.svc?first_page=1 2&publication=TELEFONI
CA-IF-2008&publisher=TELEFONICA-INFORMEANUAL-EN (select pdf version).
156. IDATE 2010, supra note 153. For details on Telia-Sonera's FTTH roll out in
Finland, see Press Release, Alcatel-Lucent, TeliaSonera and Alcatel-Lucent Deploy First
Countrywide 100 Mbps Access Network in Finland (Sept. 7, 2009).
157. See IDATE 2010, supra note 153, showing Fastweb having deployed 2,000,000
fiber lines as of December 2010 compared with 100,000 for Telecom Italia.
158. In urban areas, ULL is offered at prices sufficiently low that Telstra's primary
competitor, Optus, relies on ULL to serve new customers even when those customers are
passed by Optus' own hybrid-fiber network. See Australian Consumer and Competition
Commission, Telstra application for fixed line services exemption in Optus cable network
areas (December 2007), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/
itemId/806382; see also Henry Ergas & Richard Ralph, A Policy Framework for a New
Broadband Network, in AUSTRALIA'S BROADBAND FUTURE: FouR DooRs TO GREATER
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inability) to credibly commit to forbearing from applying mandatory
unbundling to Telstra's proposed (but thus far unbuilt) FTTN network. 159
As a result, Telstra has invested billions in its relatively unregulated
backbone, 3.5G wireless, and HFC infrastructures, while significantly
reducing investment on traditional last-mile access facilities. 160 In a tacit
admission that the regulatory regime is incapable of supporting private-
sector investment in a next generation network, the Australian government
announced, in April 2009, its intention to start a new venture, the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Corporation, for the purpose of investing up to
AU $43 billion (about U.S. $32 billion) in a new FTTH network.' 61 At the
same time, the government requested comments on a proposal to impose
functional separation on Telstra. 1
62
The situation in New Zealand was similar. Telecom New Zealand
committed, as part of the undertakings associated with functional
separation, to invest in an FTTN network, though it is unclear how rapidly
that investment is proceeding. 163 After all, "Separation Day" occurred only
slightly more than a year ago. 164 In the meantime, as in Australia, the
government has announced plans to build out an open-access fiber network
through a public-private partnership, with the government investing up to
NZ$1.5 billion (about U.S. $1 billion). 65 Telecom New Zealand would be
prohibited from participating in the project unless it agreed to complete
structural separation. 166 As with the United Kingdom and Australia, it is
difficult to interpret the government's decision except as a tacit admission
that its regulatory policies have made it uneconomic for the private sector
COMPETITON 32 (Comm. for Econ. Dev. of Austl., 2008).
159. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Hal J. Singer, Irrational Expectations: Can a
Regulator Credibly Commit to Removing an Unbundling Obligation? (AEI-Brookings Joint
Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper Series No. 07-28, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 065161.
160. For example, Telstra's investment in fixed customer access facilities dropped by
21.4 percent in the year following imposition of operational separation, despite increased
spending on its unregulated HFC network. TELSTRA, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 44-45 (2007).
161. See National Broadband Network Discussion Paper, supra note 10, at 7.
162. Id. at 17.
163. See MINISTRY OF ECON. DEv., TELECOM SEPARATION A FACT - MINISTER FOR
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MEDIA STATEMENT (2008), available at
http://www.med.govt.nztemplates/MultipageDocumentTOC34436.aspx ("Telecom has
committed to the accelerated rollout of fast broadband that will deliver advanced broadband
services to all cities and towns with more than 500 lines by 2012. Telecom announced the
details of its cabinetisation plans and investment of $1.4 billion late last year. These plans
have been built into the Separation Plan and in some circumstances extended.").
164. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
165. New Zealand Government, Ultra-fast Broadband Investment Initiative, MINISTRY OF
ECON. DEV., Overview of Initiative (2009), available at http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/
69988/Ultra-fast-Broadband-nitiative-Overview.pdf.
166. ld. at 11.
[Vol. 62
VERTICAL SEPARATION OF NETWORKS
to build a fiber network without government subsidies.
VI. IS VERTICAL SEPARATION AN OPTION FOR THE UNITED
STATES?
Proposals to vertically separate telecommunications operators were
advocated aggressively in the United States in the years immediately
following passage of the Telecommunications Act, when mandatory
unbundling played a major role in U.S. telecommunications policies. 167
With the FCC's decisions (in 2003 to 2005) to repeal UNE-P and line
sharing, and to forbear from imposing unbundling on broadband networks,
the underlying rationale for vertical separation evaporated.
1 68
Now, some critics of U.S. policies are pressing policymakers to
reverse course on mandatory unbundling and, having done so, to require
vertical separation. For example, in a recent paper published by the New
America Foundation, Marvin Ammori argues for full structural separation
of copper, fiber, and cable networks (as well as separation of wireline from
wireless);1 69 or, if structural separation were to prove politically untenable,
then "functional separation . . . [is] a necessary minimum baseline.' 170
Further, Ammori concludes that "[e]ven if unbundling is not enacted,
separation should be," as the network company would then have "some
incentives to deal with unaffiliated ISPs and other retail providers."'
71
For reasons we have explained elsewhere, 172 we disagree with
Ammori's key premises. That is, we believe the evidence demonstrates
clearly that U.S. broadband policies are working well and, in particular,
that the U.S. decision to rely on intermodal competition is producing high
levels of innovation and investment compared with countries that have
relied on mandatory unbundling.
167. For a discussion of these proposals, see Mark A. Jamison & James Sichter, Business
Separation in Telecommunications: Lessons from the US. Experience, 23 June, 2008,
available at http://warrington.ufl.edu/purc/purcdocs/papers/0809_JamisonBusiness_
Separation in.pdf.
168. See Triennial Review Remand Resources, http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/cpd/triennial
review/triennialremand.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) for a list of FCC decisions
regarding competition and network sharing.
169. Ammori, supra note 4, at 95-97. The full New American Foundation working group
of which Ammori was a part also endorses structural separation. See AMrr M. SCHEJTER,
AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR ALL: A POLICY AGENDA FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION, at xii
(2009).
170. Ammori, supra note 4, at 97.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall, Allan T. Ingraham & Hal J. Singer, Do Unbundling
Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment, 4 TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS &
POL'Y (2004); Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Broadband in the US.-Myths and Facts, in
AUSTRALIA'S BROADBAND FUTURE: FOUR DOORS TO GREATER COMPETITION 48 (Comm. for
Econ. Dev. of Austl., 2008).
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Moreover, the costs associated with reversing nearly a decade of
policy choices-and the business decisions and infrastructure investments
that have been made on the basis of those choices-would be
extraordinarily high. For example, largely as a result of its profacilities-
based competition policies, the United States now has widely deployed
digital cable and optical fiber infrastructures which-unlike the aging
copper infrastructures of most other OECD countries-are not conducive to
unbundling for technical and economic reasons. 173 In view of these facts
and of the evidence presented above, mandatory vertical separation should
not be seriously considered as a policy option in the United States.
A. Structural Separation in the U.S. Telecommunications Sector: A
Brief History
The United States is no stranger to structural separation in the
telecommunications sector. The 1984 breakup of AT&T is arguably the
most famous instance of structural separation in any industry. Moreover,
from 1970 until 1986, the FCC imposed structural separation requirements
on AT&T (and, after the 1984 breakup, the Bell Operating Companies) to
provide enhanced communications services (i.e., ISP services) only through
structurally separate subsidiaries.
Neither experiment was successful. The breakup of AT&T into
separate local and long-distance companies which were prohibited from
entering each other's markets slowed the development of competition while
imposing significant efficiency costs. 174 Ultimately, vertical integration was
reintroduced, as the RBOCs were permitted to offer long-distance services
and the two major long-distance firms, AT&T and MCI, were purchased by
AT&T's divested local carriers, SBC and Verizon. 175 As Alfred Kahn
noted, "[t]he twenty-year experience with AT&T's dissolution should have
increased our respect for the potentially large economies of scope in
telecommunications." 76
The other major U.S. experiment with structural separation was the
FCC's decision, under its Computer I and Computer II orders, 177 to require
173. See Figure 6 and attendant discussion below.
174. See, e.g., Paul W. MacAvoy, Testing for Competitiveness of Markets for Long
Distance Telephone Services: Competition Finally?, 13 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 295 (1998).
175. See Marguerite Reardon, Verizon Closes Book on MCI Merger, CNET NEWS, Jan.
6, 2006, available at http://news.cnet.com/SBC-closes-AT38T-acquisition/2100-1036_3-
5961206.html.
176. ALFRED E. KAHN, LESSONS FROM DEREGULATION: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH 24 (2004).
177. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs (Second
Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980); Regulatory and Policy
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communications Services and
Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971); Regulatory and Policy
[Vol. 62
VERTICAL SEPARATION OF NETWORKS
AT&T (and, after 1984, its local subsidiaries) to offer enhanced
telecommunications services through a separate (wholesale) subsidiary. In
its landmark 1986 Computer III decision, 178 the FCC reversed course,
concluding that the efficiency costs of structural separation outweighed any
possible benefits. Specifically, the FCC found that
[s]tructural separation effectively prohibits the offering of all enhanced
services that could be efficiently integrated or collocated with AT&T's
basic services, but that cannot be offered on a cost-effective basis
subject to structural separation. Thus, as a result of our regulatory
requirements, services that would provide valuable benefits to the
public may never be offered. . . .Structural separation for AT&T's
enhanced services operations may also potentially deny it the
opportunity to realize economies of scope from the commonality of
inputs (such as technology and expertise) that it uses to create its
different products. . . .The costs of foregone opportunities for new
services and scope economies are supplemented by the more obvious
direct costs of duplicating personnel and facilities.
Accordingly, the FCC concluded that "our structural separation
requirements create significant inefficiencies for AT&T and consumers in
the enhanced services market and should be removed and replaced with
appropriate nonstructural safeguards."'
80
The failures of these two experiments with structural separation may
partially explain why--despite strong urgings from new entrants to do so-
the United States did not adopt a structural separation mandate as part of its
efforts to implement mandatory unbundling under the Telecommunications
Act. Instead, the United States pursued a "behavioral" approach, imposing
and enforcing a "carrot and stick" system of incentives to encourage
incumbents to offer wholesale services on a nondiscriminatory basis.'
8 1
The regulatory carrot was based on the government's desire to "re-
integrate" local and long-distance services by allowing RBOCs to enter the
long-distance market, which the RBOCs (recognizing that they were the
low-cost providers of the service) were obviously eager to do. 182 Thus, the
1996 Telecommunications Act conditioned RBOC entry into interLATA
long-distance markets on their completing Section 271 of the Act's "14-
point checklist" of market opening steps, such as creating
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and
Facilities, Tentative Decision of the Commission, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970).
178. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986).
179. Id. paras. 79-81.
180. Id. para. 79.
181. 47U.S.C.§§251,271.
182. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K. Leonard and J. Gregory Sidak, Does Bell
Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit Consumers?, 70
ANTITRUST L. J. 463, 482 (2002).
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nondiscriminatory OSS systems for provisioning of services by wholesale
customers.13 The 14-point checklist was ultimately transformed by the
FCC into thousands of pages of detailed performance standards, each of
which had to be met by the RBOCs on a state-by-state basis before they
were permitted to enter the long-distance market.' 84
The 1996 Act also provided for a robust regulatory stick. Under
Section 251 of the Act, and corresponding provisions of state regulatory
statutes, all incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs, including smaller
incumbent telephone companies as well as the seven RBOCs) were
required to unbundle all network elements "necessary" for competitors to
compete successfully or without which the competitors would be
"impaired.' ' 8 5 In implementing these provisions, the FCC specifically
imposed nondiscrimination requirements,'8 6 which were enforceable (and
enforced) by large fines.'87
While most of the patients ultimately died in the end, the U.S. policy
was at least a therapeutic success. By the end of 2004, entrants had
captured nearly thirty-three million lines, of which approximately sixty
percent were leased from the incumbent carriers. 8 8 Thus, the behavioral
approach to unbundling adopted by the FCC allowed entrants to obtain
access to unbundled facilities with relatively little difficulty. 189
Unfortunately, few of these carriers had viable business plans, and most
vanished or were acquired at pennies on the dollar. 90 Accordingly,
183. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B) (2006).
184. The relevant documents are found on the FCC's website at Triennial Review
Remand Resources, http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/cpd/triennial-review/triennialremand.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
185. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (2006).
186. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, F.C.C.R. 15499, paras. 307-16 (1996).
187. See, e.g., Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390,402 (7th Cir. 2000).
[T]he process established in § 252 of the 1996 Act for review of negotiated
[wholesale] agreements, both for substance and for implementation, provides an
extra safeguard.... Furthermore, the record thus far is one of active use of these
review procedures; there would be no basis at all to find that they are illusory.
Id.
188. See the FCC's semiannual Local Competition reports. Local Telephone
Competition and Broadband Deployment, http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2010). The reported share of entrant lines accounted for by unbundled
incumbent subscriber loops varies slightly depending on the source of the data used by the
FCC. See, in particular, Tables 3 and 4 of recent Local Competition reports. The December
2004 data are available at Triennial Review Remand Resources,
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/cpd/triennialreview/triennialremand.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2010).
189. For a discussion of the causes of the CLECs' demise, see generally Larry F. Darby,
Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Joseph S. Kraemer, The CLEC Experiment: Anatomy of a Meltdown,
PRoGREss ON PoNr 9.23, PRoGREss ON PoINT (Sept. 2002).
190. Id.
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competitors' arguments for vertical separation, though pressed aggressively
at both the state and federal levels,' 91 were ultimately rejected. 92
B. Unlike Countries That Have Adopted Functional Separation,
the United States Has Virtually Ubiquitous Platform Competition
As noted above, the U.S. experiment with mandatory unbundling
under the Telecommunications Act was limited primarily to voice services.
By contrast, the modem debate over unbundling (and hence separation) is
focused on broadband services and next generation networks. Thus, the
question for policymakers is the extent to which infrastructure competition
is feasible in the market for broadband communications now or in the
future; and, to the extent it is not feasible, whether the benefits of
unbundling (and hence allowing competition among retailer/ISPs) exceed
the costs. A decision by regulators to impose mandatory unbundling is a
necessary (but far from sufficient) condition for even considering a vertical
separation mandate.'
93
We do not propose to fully address the nature of competition in
broadband markets or the pros and cons of mandatory unbundling in this
Article. We do note, however, that the case for mandatory unbundling is
weaker in the United States than in most other OECD countries due to the
presence of multiple competing broadband infrastructures in the United
States. In contrast to most OECD countries, which rely primarily on xDSL
services provided over the last-mile copper networks of telephone company
191. See. e.g., T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Why ADCO?
Why Now? An Economic Exploration into the Future of Industry Structure for the 'Last
Mile' in Local Telecommunications Markets, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 421 (2002).
192. The high watermark came in Pennsylvania in 2000-01, where the Pennsylvania
PUC tentatively ordered structural separation by Verizon before concluding the benefits
would be de minimis. See Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n., Structural Separation of Bell Atlantic-
Pennsylvania, Inc., Retail and Wholesale Operations, Opinion and Order, Docket. No. M-
00001353, 33 (2001).
[A]nything less than full structural separation . . . would require continuing
regulatory oversight, even though part of our goal in deregulating the industry is
to reduce oversight. However, . . . even with the implementation of structural
separation of Verizon's wholesale and retail arms, no less regulatory oversight
than that currently prevailing will be required to ensure compliance.
Id. For more on the U.S. debate over structural separation, see, e.g., Robert W. Crandall & J.
Gregory Sidak, Is Structural Separation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary
for Competition?, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 335 (2002); Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Randolph J. May &
Charles A. Eldering, Regulatory Overkill: Pennsylvania's Proposal to Breakup Bell Atlantic,
PROGRESS ON PoiNT (Dec. 1999).
193. In this regard, we find Ammori's suggestion that structural separation be required
even in the absence of mandatory unbundling to be nonsensical, since the only plausible
rationale for creating two companies is to ensure that the "monopoly" network provider sells
its services on a wholesale basis to multiple retailers on a nondiscriminatory basis, i.e., that
it unbundles. See supra note 127.
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incumbents, the leading broadband modality in the United States is cable
modem service, which is available to ninety-three percent of U.S.
households (compared with only eighty-two percent availability of DSL
service) and which accounts for over forty-five percent of all broadband
subscriptions (compared with thirty-one percent for xDSL).194
Figure 5 below shows broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants, by
technology (excluding mobile wireless), as reported by the OECD for the
United States and for the five countries that have adopted some form of
mandatory separation. 9' As the figure indicates, cable modem accounts for
more than fifty percent of U.S. broadband subscribers, as measured by the
OECD, compared with twenty-one percent for the United Kingdom,
nineteen percent for Sweden, and seventeen percent for Australia. 196
Simply put, the United States-at least in part because of its decisions to
rely on infrastructure competition rather than mandatory unbundling-is
now blessed with two nearly ubiquitous broadband infrastructures, a fact
which distinguishes it from most other OECD countries.
Figure 5
Broadband Subscribers per 100 Inhabitants
(by technology, December 2008)
35-
30 1D. !at--e * Fie/LAN m0hf"
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194. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., WiRELiNE COMPETITON BUREAU, FCC, HtIGH-
SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2007, at chart 4 (2009)
(basing statistics on "advanced services lines," i.e., those providing more than 200-Kbps
service in both directions). See Data Compilation, supra note I110.
195. Id.
196. See id. Sweden's apparently robust platform competition comes from FTTH, which
has been provided by municipal governments at very high costs. See Mikael Sandberg &
Richard Jones, FTTH in Sweden: An Entrepreneurial Perspective, BROADBAND PROPERTIES,
Jan. 2010, available at http://www.bbpmag.com/2010mags/J~anI0/BBPJanI0_FTTH
Sweden.pdf.- It is curious that the Swedish national regulator should take such a dim view of
the strength of this platform competition that it feels compelled to pursue functional
separation of TeliaSonera, the incumbent.
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Moreover, competition in the United States is growing rapidly as new
infrastructure competitors enter the market and existing competitors invest
in major infrastructure upgrades. On the wireline front, both major U.S.
telcos are investing heavily in fiber-AT&T with FTTN U-Verse project
and Verizon with FiOS, an FTTH network that now passes more than
fifteen million premises. 197 In response, cable companies have begun
upgrading their infrastructures to DOCSIS 3.0, which permits download
speeds of up to 160 Mbps.
98
The United States is also well served by mobile broadband. All four
national wireless operators offer 3G services, and ninety-two percent of
Americans live in census blocks served by 3G wireless broadband
service' 99 Verizon is committed to rolling out 4G LTE wireless networks
beginning in 2009,200 with AT&T scheduled to begin deployment in
2011.20' LTE will offer peak download speeds of 50 to 60 Mbps,
20 2
allowing it to compete directly with wireline services. At the same time,
Clearwire, with $3.2 billion in financing from Google, Intel, and some
cable companies, already provides fixed wireless broadband services in
fifty-seven U.S. cities, and has begun rolling out a 4G Wi-Max network.20 3
Analysts now predict that wireless broadband will begin capturing share
204from wireline services in much the same way.
In short, the U.S. broadband market is distinguished from the markets
in many other developed nations by the fact that the copper
telecommunications infrastructure is not the dominant broadband
infrastructure. Hence, the case for unbundling the telcos' broadband
networks (without unbundling cable as well) is extremely difficult to make
on competition policy grounds (and likely also would be difficult to make
in court). Moreover, with entry underway by multiple wireless providers,
the U.S. market is clearly becoming more competitive, further weakening
197. Verizon Communications, 2009 Annual Report, 14.
198. See, e.g., Comcast, Annual Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Form JO-K, 31 (2009).
199. Implementation of Sec. 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Thirteenth Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 6185, at 6193 (2009).
200. Glenn Fleishman, Verizon Ups Ante on LTE Deployment: 2009, ARS TECHNICA,
Dec. 10, 2008, available at http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/12/verizon-says-early-
lte-deployment-in-2009.ars.
201. AT&T Boosts 3G Data Speeds - Outlines LTE Upgrade Path, CELLULAR-NEWS,
May 27, 2009, available at http://www.cellular-news.com/story/37690.php.
202. Posting of Larry Dignan to Between the Lines, http://blogs.zdnet.coml
BTL/?p=13058 (Feb. 18, 2009, 3:49 AM).
203. Clearwire Corporation, Annual Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Form JO-K, 8 (2009).
204. See NIELSEN MOBILE, CRITICAL MASS: THE WORLDWIDE STATE OF THE MOBILE WEB
(2008), available at http://www.nielsenmobile.com/documents/CriticalMass.pdf.
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the prospects for unbundling.
Even the staunchest advocates of regulation seem to agree that
infrastructure competition, when it is an option, is the most desirable
approach. EU Commissioner Viviane Reding, for example, concluded in a
recent speech that
effective infrastructure competition has been one of the main factors
contributing to broadband rollout. Countries such as the Netherlands
and Denmark, that have the highest broadband penetration levels in the
world ahead of Korea and Japan, are those that have a real choice of
infrastructures.205
Like Denmark and the Netherlands, the United States does have a "real
choice of infrastructures," and it therefore seems unlikely that regulators
will reverse course and impose mandatory unbundling, let alone vertical
separation, on the U.S. market.
C. Unbundling Existing U.S. Next Generation Networks Would Be
Costly, If Not Infeasible
The economic feasibility of unbundling telecommunications networks
depends on the architecture of the network. In most European countries,
where the rollout of next generation networks is in a very early phase,
regulators are debating whether and to what extent they should dictate
network architectures in order to ensure the continued viability of
unbundling. 206 In the United States, where deployment of next generation
networks is well advanced, that debate is largely settled. The network
architectures that have been deployed in the United States are not
particularly conducive to unbundling, and there is no practical way of
modifying them.
Figure 6 is a very simple depiction of the differences between three
types of networks: VDSL (i.e., FTTN), point-to-multipoint (also known as
"passive optical network" or PON) fiber, and point-to-point (P2P) fiber.2 °7
Both FTTN and PON infrastructures utilize a shared optical fiber
connection from the central office to a cabinet located somewhere near the
customers' premises (e.g., in a neighborhood or apartment building).20 8 The
difference between the two is that, with FTTN, the last-mile connection
205. Viviane Reding, Member of the Eur. Comm'n Responsible for Info., Soc'y &
Media, Speech to the Second Bus. Roundtable with the Eur. Comm'n: Why Europe Needs
Even More Efficient Telecommunications Markets in Order to be Competitive 2 (Jan. 29,
2008).
206. See, e.g., ERG Opinion/Common Position on Regulatory Principles of NGA, ERG
(2007)16rev2 (2007).
207. Taylor Reynolds, Fiber Investment Challenges and Opportunities, PowerPoint
Presentation to OECD 28 (June 6, 2008).
208. See infra note 212.
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(from the cabinet to the customer) is copper, whereas with PON it is
fiber.2° P2P fiber, on the other hand, utilizes a separate strand of fiber from
the central office to each and every customer's premises. 210
The difference between FTTN and PON, on the one hand, and P2P,
on the other, has profound implications for unbundling. In a P2P
architecture, competitors could install optical switching equipment in the
incumbent's central office, just as they install DSLAMs today to deliver
DSL services, allowing them to duplicate the entire network except for the
"last mile." With FTTN or PON, on the other hand, competitors would
need to deploy equipment in each neighborhood cabinet, which may not be
economical due to the larger required investment and reduced economies of
scale. In short, it may turn out unbundling of next generation networks is
economically feasible only in a P2P infrastructure. If, as European
regulators seem to believe, infrastructure-based, last-mile competition is
also infeasible in many situations, 211 the implication is that facilities-based
competition in next generation networks will require regulators not only to
mandate unbundling, but also to mandate the architecture of next
generation networks so as to make unbundling workable.
Figure 6:
VDSL vs. PON vs. P2P Network Architectures
212
Point toVDSL multipoint Point to point
ang Exchange Exchange
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While the wisdom of having regulators dictate network architectures
209. See id.
210. See IDATE2010,supra note 153.
211. See, e.g., ERG (2007)16rev2, supra note 206, at Sec. VI (concluding that next
generation network "investments are likely to reinforce the importance of scale and scope
economies, thereby reducing the degree of replicability, potentially leading to an enduring
economic bottleneck.").
212. Reynolds, supra note 207.
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and technologies is at best debatable,213 in the United States, at least, the
issue would appear to be settled. Both major incumbent carriers, AT&T
(FTTN) and Verizon (PON), have deployed networks that likely make
unbundling economically infeasible. Short of demanding that these two
firms literally dig up billions of dollars worth of modem, high-capacity
broadband infrastructure, regulators likely have no practical way of
imposing an unbundling network on these firms or their broadband
networks. 1 4 And, as we have explained, there is no basis for forcing
vertical separation in the absence of mandatory unbundling. Hence, we
conclude that the imposition of forced vertical separation in the United
States is a solution in search of a problem (discrimination associated with
mandatory unbundling) that is unlikely to arise in the first place.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is both theoretical and empirical support for the proposition that
forced vertical separation of telecommunications networks will reduce
economic efficiency, slow innovation, and impede performance in markets
where it is imposed. Similarly, mandatory unbundling, which vertical
separation is supposed to facilitate, has also been shown to harm market
performance. The evidence presented here is consistent with both
propositions-that is, the evidence shows no increase in either investment
or broadband penetration in nations that have mandated vertical separation;
indeed, the evidence suggests that vertical separation has impeded the
rollout of next generation networks. Despite renewed calls for separation
213. As between PON and P2P architectures for deploying FTP, PON has significant
economic advantages, and is far and away the most widely deployed. See, e.g., Paul
Whittlesey, "PON, P2P, or Active Ethernet?" (Apr. 2007) (on file with the author); see also
Press Release, Inventory of FTTH in Europe, supra note 155, at 28 (showing P2P
deployments account for only 14 percent of worldwide deployments and stating "Ethernet
P2P [during 2009] deployments remained marginal.").
214. Hybrid-fiber-coax networks utilize a fundamentally different architecture from
either DSL or FTTH/FTTC. While bit-stream access is technically feasible, unbundling (i.e.,
making available a last-mile "dumb pipe" connection) is not. See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning
High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Order and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, paras. 12-19 (2002); WALTER CIclORA
ET AL., MODERN CABLE TELEVISION TECHNOLOGY: VIDEO, VOICE, AND DATA
COMuMNIcATIONs 5-6 (2d ed. 2004); Emy Tseng & Sharon Eisner Gillett, Open Access to
Cable Data Networks, available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/1520/
Tseng-Gillett.pdfsequence=l. While cable network unbundling is under consideration in
some jurisdictions, including Canada and the Netherlands, it would consist of allowing ISPs
to offer services over cable, not forced leasing of last-mile physical connections. See Can.
Radio-television and Telecomm. Comm'n, Proceeding to Consider the Appropriateness of
Mandating Certain Wholesale High-Speed Access Services, Telecom Notice of
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mandates coming from some quarters in the United States, the growing
evidence of its harmful effects, the increasing competitiveness and
improving performance of the U.S. market, and the large sunk costs U.S.
carriers have made in difficult-to-unbundle infrastructures demonstrate that
it would be unwise to impose either mandatory unbundling or vertical
separation in the United States.
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